The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises: Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International Law and Policy by Backer, Larry C.
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
Volume 50 
Issue 4 October 2017 Article 1 
2017 
The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises: 
Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and 
International Law and Policy 
Larry C. Backer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Larry C. Backer, The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises: Emerging Conceptual 
Structures and Principles in National and International Law and Policy, 50 Vanderbilt Law Review 827 
(2021) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol50/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For 
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT JOURNAL
OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
VOLUME 50 OCTOBER 2017 NUMBER 4
The Human Rights Obligations of
State-Owned Enterprises: Emerging
Conceptual Structures and Principles




The distinction between the obligations of public and
private entities, and their relation to law, is well known in
classical political and legal theory. States have a duty that is
undertaken through law; enterprises have a responsibility that
is embedded in their governance. These fundamental divisions
form part of the current international efforts to institutionalize
human rights-related norms on and through states and
enterprises, and most notably through the U.N. Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights. The problems of
conforming to evolving norms becomes more difficult where
states project their authority through commercial enterprises.
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These state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operate where state duty
and enterprise responsibility meet.
This Article takes a close look at the issue of the human
rights duties of states as owners of SOEs, and of the
responsibilities of SOEs for their own human rights related
conduct. The form and substance of these duties and
responsibilities are considered in light of three recent
developments. The first is the increasingly prominent focus
on SOEs as human rights-bearing institutions in
international soft law and norms. The second is the
substantial change in the direction of US policy in trade and
globalization. The other is the maturation of Chinese
outbound economic and investment policy, where its
construction of an outbound nationalist globalization-the
One Belt One Road policy-relies to some extent on the
projection of commercial power through Chinese SOEs.
The Article offers a set of challenges and
recommendations for further development. These
recommendations and challenges suggest that issues of
corporate personality, sovereign immunity, asset partition,
and regulatory compartmentalization may well hobble the
work of embedding human rights within the operation of
states as owners and SOEs as public enterprises. To embed
human rights more effectively in accordance with evolving
international standards, it may be necessary to substantially
change contemporary and backwards-looking legal
frameworks within which SOEs now operate. Moreover, the
Article demonstrates the shortcomings of the current strongly
held consensus that the focus of regulatory governance must
be grounded in and through a formally constituted
enterprise, the SOE, rather than focusing regulation on
economic activity irrespective of the form in which it is
undertaken. Until these conceptual issues are considered, the
effective regulation of SOEs, supply chains, and
multinational corporations will remain elusive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
(Ancient Automobile Trinidad, Cuba 2015 Pix ( Larry Catd Backer 2016)
Consider the antique automobile pictured above. It sits rusting
in a shop, still beautiful but now incapable of being driven anywhere
and always awaiting repair. One can repair the auto, and perhaps
one can drive it. But it remains obsolete, relates poorly to the modern
highway and the objectives of driving, and has become less relevant
to everyday life. It produces a comforting nostalgia for the museum or
the Sunday drive, but is hardly fit for modern life.
This Article takes that automobile as its starting point.
Sovereign conduct on the margins of the law, the title of the
Symposium for which this Article was produced,' is perhaps no better
manifested than in the commercial activities of states. And it is most
fully formed when the state-the fundamental political body
corporate-reconstitutes part of itself as an economic body corporate
to engage in activities in national and transnational markets.2 Yet,
1. Larry Catd Backer, "Sovereign Conduct on the Margins of the Law" Notes
From the Symposium Hosted by the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, LAW AT
THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 17, 2017), http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2017/02/sovereign-conduct-on-margins-of-law.htm1 [https://perma.cclXRE6-72BS]
(archived Feb. 22, 2017).
2. JAN M. BROEKMAN & LARRY CATA BACKER, LAWYERS MAKING MEANING: THE
SEMIOTICS OF LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION II 176-78 (2013).
831
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
like the antique autombilile in the picture above, the conventional
law of the commercial activities of states, especially when undertaken
in the form of state owned enterprises (SOEs), suggest not merely
that old auto, but the futility of bringing life back to a model of
economic activity that has not had a sound foundation since the
beginning of this century. This futility is most acutely expressed in
current debate touching on state and SOE engagement with the
human rights conseqeunces of their economic activity. Global elites
might better consider the value of that work for the purposes to which
it is being deployed. This Article develops that thesis in the context of
recent efforts at the public international level to breathe new life into
an old machine and suggests the contours of new approaches-a new
regulatory machine for new times. This Introduction provides the
context for the argument that follows. It sketches the emerging
character of SOEs within globalization and the failures of governance
regimes to regulate the conduct norms for these enterprises.
The conduct of economic activities through SOEs occupies the
space where public duty and private obligation meet-that is, where
the legal duties of the state merge with the governance
responsibilities of the private organization. The SOE does not easily
fit within the classical division of obligation, expressed in political
and legal theory, between public and private entities, or into those
entities' respective relationships to law.3 States have a duty that is
undertaken through law; 4 enterprises have a responsibility that is
embedded in their governance.5 These fundamental divisions form
part of the current international efforts to institutionalize human
rights related norms on and through states and enterprises, most
notably through the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and
Human Rights (UNGP). 6 The problems of conforming to evolving
norms become more difficult where states project their authority
through commercial enterprises-that is, where the societal (and
3. See generally, e.g., JoSe ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW
MAKERS 45-65 (2005); Jos6 Alvarez, Are Corporations 'Subjects' of International Law?,
9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 1 (2011); A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the
Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of
Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 133 (2001).
4. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 26-29 (1995).
5. See, e.g., David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence
of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 931, 953-56 (2004); see generally Larry CatA Backer, From Moral Obligation to
International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational
Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 591 (2008) (suggesting measures that conform to the
classical division of authority).
6. See generally Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect,
Respect, and Remedy" Framework, HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter UNGP].
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economic) governance order of the enterprise is conflated with the
political and legal order of the state.7
SOEs have undergone tremendous change in both operation and
framework ideology since 1945.8 The contemporary faces of SOEs also
reflect substantial divergences in the character and operation of
SOEs.9 Within globalization, consensus about the role and operation
of SOEs, like that of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs),10 has moved
toward a commercial and private model." For all that change, SOEs
remain an important element of national macroeconomic policies and
a means through which states may directly operationalize
macroeconomic policies through governmental instrumentailities;1 2
7. See generally, e.g., John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The
Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (2007). The interstices of that
conflation have produced some interesting conceptual scholarship. See, e.g., Eric
Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1901 (2003).
8. Compare, e.g., THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE
WESTERN WORLD (Pier Angelo Toninelli ed., 1983) [hereinafter Toninelli] (discussing
SOEs before 1945), with Philippe Aghion et al., The Behaviour of State Firms in
Eastern Europe, Pre-Privatisation, 38 EUR. EcON. REV. 1327 (1994) (discussing SOEs in
Soviet-dominated Europe through the 1980s), and Toninelli, supra, at 103-253
(discussing Western European SOEs).
9. For a discussion of European SOEs within the European Union, see
generally Angela Huyue Zhang, The Single-Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb for
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 805 (2012) (discussing
anti-trust treatment of European SOEs). For a discussion of the operation and
principles of Chinese SOE operation, see generally Fan Gang & Nicholas C. Hope, The
Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy, in US-CHINA ECONOMIC
RELATIONS IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS: TOWARDS DEEPER ENGAGEMENT AND MUTUAL
BENEFIT 2-17 (2013), www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-
Chapter+16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5362-7MV8] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Fan Gang]. Many developing states have created SOEs through which to manage their
natural resources, especially in the extractive sector. For a discussion, see generally,
e.g., Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD POL. 297
(1999).
10. See generally, e.g., INT'L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES:
"SANTIAGO - PRINCIPLES" (Oct. 2008), http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/
santiagoprinciples_00.pdf [https://perma.cclU7RL-3M3D] (archived Aug. 27, 2017);
Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Capacity Building, Development, and
Governance, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Backer,
Sovereign Wealth Funds].
11. See generally, e.g., OECD, GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2015 ed.) http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/2615061e.pdf9expires=1493181688&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=0613
E3D8DE30A7861776806095099811)[https://perma.cc/Q4KV-SD76] (archived Aug. 27,
2017) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES].
12. See generally, e.g., A. Erin Bass & Subrata Chakrabarty, Resource Security:
Competition for Global Resources, Strategic Intent, and Governments as Owners. 45 J.
INT'L Bus. STUD. 961, 975-78 (2014); Francisco Flores-Macias, The Return of State-
Owned Enterprises, HARV. INT'L REV. (Apr. 4, 2009) http://hir.harvard.edularticle/a=1854
[https://perma.cc/ED73-ZFF5] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
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they continue to serve quite important public purposes.'3 The SOE's
importance is in part the product of the malleability of the SOE
concept itself, which has made the device a useful tool for states.14
That malleability has also permitted SOEs to become an increasingly
important factor in globalized economic activity, 15 shaping its
patterns and approaches with a reference to the national policy and
politics of the owner-state.
But their use by states has also been criticized for inhibiting the
construction of robust internal and global markets, in part because of
their inefficiency, 16 and in part because such open and robust
markets serve as the foundation of economic activity within and
beyond states.'7 The difficulty stems from the relationship between
states and their economic enterprises. On the one hand, states
regulate all economic enterprises-including SOEs (to the extent they
are treated like other similarly constituted entities). On the other
hand, the state that regulates also owns the regulated entity; the
state, in this instance, may distort markets by using its regulatory
power to favor its own entities over others. That produces
asymmetries in market power that might challenge the efficacy of the
emerging market-driven regulatory structures of globalization and its
13. See generally, e.g., Jing-Lin Duanmu, State-Owned MNCs and Host
Country Expropriation Risk: The Role of Home State Soft Power and Economic Gunboat
Diplomacy, 45 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 1044 (2014) (arguing SOEs promote international
business); James S. Ang & David K. Ding, Government Ownership and the Performance
of Government-Linked Companies: The Case of Singapore, 16 J. MULTINATIONAL FIN.
MGMT. 64 (2006).
14. See generally, e.g., Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G. Lazzarini, Leviathan in
Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance
(May 30, 2012) (working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2070942 [https://perma.cc/L8DF-ZC9N] (archived Aug. 27, 2017)
[hereinafter Musacchio].
15. See generally Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et. al., Governments as Owners: State-
Owned Multinational Companies, 45 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 919 (2014); Lin Cui & Fuming
Jiang, State Ownership Effect on Firms' FDI Ownership Decisions Under Institutional
Pressure: A study of Chinese Outward-Investing Firms, 43 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 264
(2012).
16. See generally, e.g., Gabriel Wildau, China's state-owned zombie economy,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/253d7eb0-ca6c-11e5-84df-
70594b99fc47 [https://perma.cc/JA7W-S52T] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); Julia Ya Qin,
WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) - A Critical Appraisal
of the China Accession Protocol, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 863 (2004). But see Musacchio,
supra note 14.
17. For an early version, see generally DOUGLAS F. LAMONT, FOREIGN STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES: THREAT TO AMERICAN BUSINESS (1976). For contemporary
consideration of the issue, see generally, e.g., IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE
MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND CORPORATIONS? (2010); see also
Fernanda Ribeiro Cahen, Internationalization of State-Owned Enterprises Through
Foreign Direct Investment, 55 REV. DE ADMINISTRACAO DE EMPRESAS 645, 653-55
(2015).
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so-called neoliberal order.18 The asymmetries run beyond the usual
problem of state subsidies, from that of states being tempted to tilt
markets in favor of SOEs (producing a sort of systemic corruption in
markets driven systems), to that of issues of interference with
sovereignty when SOEs serve as the apex enterprise in global
production chains.19
The legal status of an SOE varies from being a part of
government to being a stock company with a state as a regular
stockholder. 20 But their purpose-national development and the
projection of economic power abroad-has remained constant, though
with quite distinct differences in emphasis and application among
states inclined to use them. 21 The regional variations are quite
contextually rooted and historically driven.
European models from the 1980s were driven by the principles of
free movement basic to the EU treaties, within the context of de-
socialization from the 1980s. 22 The contemporary approaches of
European states represent a long dialogue (sometimes quite strident)
between market-driven states and the brand of market-rejecting
European Marxist Leninism that characterized the old Soviet Empire
and its satellites in Europe. The apex of this European flirtation with
18. See Daniel J. Ikenson et al., Should Free Traders Support the Trans-Pacific
Partnership? An Assessment of America's Largest Preferential Trade Agreement, 54-56
(CATO Institute, Working Paper No. 39, 2016), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-393.pdf [https://perma.ce/C9ZM-DCPH] (archived Aug.
27, 2017).
19. For the OECD position, see generally OECD, COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY:
MAINTAINING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESS (2012).
An apex enterprise is the company (however organized) that resides at the top of the
production chain, that is, that effectively owns or controls the production chain that
defines the scope of its economic activities. Most multinational enterprises are apex
enterprises. The relationship among apex enterprises can be complex. For example,
Foxconn can be seen as an apex enterprise producing or assembling products for
wholesale markets, yet Foxconn is also downstream of Apple's production chain for
iphones. Larry CatA Backer, Realising Socio-Economic Rights Under Emerging Global
Regulatory Frameworks: The Potential Impact of Privatization and the Role of
Companies in China and India, in Socio-EcONOMIc RIGHTS IN EMERGING FREE
MARKETS: COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS FROM INDIA AND CHINA 44, 59-63 (Surya Deva ed.,
2016).
20. See Wei Cui, Taxing State-Owned Enterprises: Understanding a Basic
Institution of State Capitalism, 52 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 775, 787-90 (2015).
21. See generally, e.g., Hans Christiansen, The Size and Composition of the
SOE Sector in OECD Countries (OECD Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 5,
2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cwpsOs3-en [https://perma.cc/4J2J-ZR7L]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Christiansen].
22. See, e.g., Nicola Bellini, The Decline of State Owned Enterprise and the New
Foundations of the State-Industry Relationship, in Toninelli, supra note 8, at 25-48;
see generally Carles Boix, Privatizing the Public Business Sector in the 1980s: Economic
Performance, Partisan Responses, and Divided Governments, 27 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCl.
473 (1997).
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robust SOE-driven economies occurred through the 1970s 23 with
substantially different approaches to "socialism" and state
management of economic activities across democratic Europe, in
contradistinction to the central planning economies of the Soviet
Union with a negligible private sector.24 By the end of the 1990s, that
system was in the advanced stages of dismantling. The dismantling of
SOE-driven economies was propelled both by the fall of the Soviet
Union and by the rise of a level- and unsubsidized-markets ideology
within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and
reflected in the policies of the institutions of the European Union.2 5
The emerging rules constraining state aids reduced the value of state
ownership and its relevance, and economic integration made the
consequences less drastic.
The Nordic states are a current driving force in European SOEs,
under the so-called policy of Nordic Capitalism.26 Nordic Capitalism
is guided by principles of profitability and exemplary responsibility-
profits rendered to the state and the state directing the form and
effect of the responsibilities it meant to impose.2 7 Sweden provides a
23. See William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 321, 323
(2001) ("Until Margaret Thatcher's conservative government came to power in 1979,
the answer to this debate in the United Kingdom and elsewhere was that the
government should at least own the telecommunications and postal services, electric
and gas utilities, and most forms of non-road transportation (especially airlines and
railroads). Many politicians also believed the state should control certain 'strategic'
manufacturing industries, such as steel and defense production. In many countries,
state-owned banks were also given either monopoly or protected positions."); see also
Ulrich Wengenroth, The Rise and Fall of the State Owned Enterprise in Germany, in
Toninelli, supra note 8, at 103-253.
24. See generally, e.g., Richard E. Ericson, The Classical Soviet-Type Economy:
Nature of the System and Implications for Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11 (1991).
25. See the "Golden Share" cases. See Case C-367/98, Comm'n of the European
Communities [CEC] v. Portuguese Republic, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731; Case C-483/99, CEC
v. French Republic, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781; Case C-503/99, CEC v. Kingdom of Belgium,
2002 E.C.R. 1-4812; Case C-463/00, CEC v. Kingdom of Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581; Case
C-98/01, CEC v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2003 E.C.R. I-
4644; Case C-112/2005, CEC v. Federal Republic of Germany (Volkswagen), 2007
E.C.R. 1-9020; Case C-463/04 and C-464/04, Federconsumatori v. Comune di Milano,
2004 E.C.R. 1-10433. For a discussion of the importance of the "Golden Share" cases,
see generally Larry Cati Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as
Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, And the Public Law Element in
Private Choice of Law, 82 TuL. L. REv. 1801 (2008).
26. See generally, e.g., TORBEN M. ANDERSEN ET AL., THE NORDIC MODEL:
EMBRACING GLOBALIZATION AND SHARING RISKS (2007), https://economics.mit.edufiles/5726
[https://perma.cc/H3B4-7QRH] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); The Nordic Countries: The Next
Supermodel, THE EcONOMIST (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/
21571136-politicians-both-right-and-left-could-learn-nordic-countries-next-supermodel
[https://perma.cc/5F4Y-7C9L].
27. See Sari Kuvaja, Expectations for state-owned companies: profitability and
exemplary responsibility, NORDIC MORNING (2015), http://reporting2015.nordicmorning.com/
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good example of the model with respect to the operation of Swedish
SOEs, in which the state "has a major responsibility to be an active
and professional owner. The Government's overall objectives are for
the companies to generate value and, where applicable, to ensure that
specially commissioned public policy assignments are well
performed." 28 Other European states also maintain state
enterprises.29 France, for example, "has equity positions in 81 French
companies, ranging from Aistom to Orange and EDF, worth an
estimated f90bn and employing 1.7m people. It keeps a firm guiding
hand on hundreds more, ready and able to defend its interests."3 0
In contrast, developing states find SOEs useful as instruments of
internal development, usually for the control and exploitation of
national resources.3 1 Despite substantial pressure to privatize SOEs
at the end of the twentieth century,3 2 developing state SOEs might
again be thought to serve as a mechanism for state planning and
macro-economic policies.3 3 Indeed, within developing states, a new
turn on state to state economic activities may now be undertaken
through SOE investment. In Peru, for example, the Las Bambas
mines were purchased in 2014 by a consortium of Chinese SOEs.34
en/corporate-responsibility/expectations-for-state-owned-companies-profitability-and-
exemplary-responsibility.html [https://perma.ce/3SJV-XLSK] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
28. See Objectives for state-owned companies, GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF
SWEDEN, http://www.government.se/government-policy/state-owned-enterprises/goals-
for-state-owned-companies/ (last updated Mar. 10, 2015) [https://perma.ccl7KGY-
EBNU] (archived Aug. 27, 2017). The Swedish state speaks here of the use of its
ownership to move forward balanced gender distribution policies, economic goals,
sustainability goals, and additional goals assigned to specific enterprises. Id.
29. See, e.g., Christiansen, supra note 21 (describing substantial investment in
enterprises across OECD states, both in terms of overall employment and in terms of
investment in enterprises). For Germany, see Germany - Competition from State-
Owned Enterprises, EXPORT.GOV (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Germany-Competition-from-State-Owned-
Enterprises [https://perma.ccN3CQ-5N25] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
30. See Michael Strothard, France: The Politics of State Ownership, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9be75d5c-a72e-11e6-8898-79a99e2a4de6
[https://perma.cc/7V8S-DML6] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
31. See, e.g., OECD, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS 34 (2015) ("If the government of a low-income country embarks on a strategy
of catch-up industrialisation, a case can certainly be made for establishing SOEs to
carry out key functions.").
32. See, e.g., John Nellis, The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From
State-owned Enterprises to Private Participation in Infrastructure -and Back? 37




ck.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ETW-K37Y] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
33. See HA-JOON CHANG, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM 8-14 (2007),
https://esa.un.org/techcoop/documents/pn-soereformnote.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ8T-
KSJF] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
34. See XIMENA BENAVIDES REVERDITTO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND STATE
OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOES) 1 (2014), https://law.yale.edulsystem/files/documents/pdf/
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Especially in the extractives sector SOEs owned by developing states,
the role of the state varies substantially "but can include tax
collection, assignment of operating rights, monitoring and
management of cadasters, setting rules governing performance,
ensuring compliance by companies with legislation, regulation and
contracts, and approving key decisions by partner companies."3 5
For developing states, SOEs are a legacy of both the ideologically
driven post-colonial policies of their first generation of leaders, and
the then fashionable policies that sought to convince developing
states that the future lay in export substitution policies and in
economic development that would produce a self-sufficient state.
Globalization has substantially softened these ideologies and in the
process also reduced the vigor with which developing states have
sought to build up and deploy SOEs. Yet especially in resource-rich
states, SOEs remain an important part of macroeconomic and
production management. SOEs are also important stabilizers of labor
markets and thus indirectly of political stability.36 Increasingly, these
efforts have been tied to stabilization strategies that are advanced by
international financial institutions (IFIs) and in conjunction with
state SWFs as the basis of development efforts, including
development finance. Not inconsequential is the use of SOEs (and
SWFs) as a means of reducing corruption in state where corruption is
systemic.37 Producing autonomous enterprises that may be managed
or made accountable through mechanisms not under the control of
state officials may sometimes serve to protect those resources. Yet
issues of productivity and economic viability continue to weaken
these enterprises, even as they continue to be viewed as essential to
developing states.3 8
SELA14_BenavidesCV Eng.pdf [https://perma.ccIB56M-EDBM] (archived Aug. 27,
2017).
35. See NAT. RES. GOVERNANCE INSTIT., STATE PARTICIPATION AND STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES: ROLES, BENEFITS, AND CHALLENGES 4 (2015), https://resourcegovernance.org/
sites/default/files/nrgi-State-Participation-and-SOEs.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD4F-U5BA]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017).
36. See generally, e.g., Arkamoy Dutta Majumdar, West Bengal to restructure
state-owned enterprises, LIVE MINT (Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.livemint.com/
Companies/zUcXsREgJSe875buUFuGiL/West-Bengal-to-restructure-stateowned-
enterprises.html [https://perma.cclBBM7-Y78Z] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) ("The
government said at least 16 companies are to be merged and five subsidiaries of West
Bengal Electronics Industry Development Corp. Ltd, or Webel, to be wound up. The
state would, after the restructuring, continue to run 44 focused enterprises, most of
which, though, are loss-making. Chief minister Mamata Banerjee reiterated that this
restructuring will not lead to job cuts.").
37. But see SOEs holding regulation not in line with laws, says economist, THE
JAKARTA POST (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/02/01/soes-
holding-regulation-not-in-line-with-laws-says-economist.html [https://perma.cc/HFQ4-
BNB6] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
38. See, e.g., PM says too many state-owned enterprises underperforming,
SATURDAY EXPRESS (Jan. 18 2017), http://www.trinidadexpress.com/20170118/
business/pm-says-too-many-state-owned-enterprises-underperforming
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Since the 1980s, The People's Republic of China has been the site
of the most vibrant contemporary development of Marxist-Leninist
frameworks for SOEs.3 9 It has developed a markets-based socialism
grounded in strong markets and state ownership of substantial
sectors of the economy.40 This approach-socialist modernization-is
grounded in the notion that all of the productive forces of society
must be available to the state through regulatory governance or
direct command structures to help the Chinese vanguard party fulfill
its core obligation to move society along toward the establishment of a
communist society.41 Through China's Go-Out Policies (AlfW1 i a ) 4 2
and policies on internationalism,4 3 Chinese SOEs have become more
and more important in global economic activity. They also have
become an important element in the socialization of Chinese
approaches to Marxist state planning.44 These might also become
more influential as a form of economic productivity in developing
[https://perma.cc/5BUF-8XC6] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) ("In his address, Rowley said
that since the 1960's government has become involved in various aspects of the local
economy to the point that this policy has brought "us to our present situation where we
have about 100 state enterprises and their subsidiaries."); BIDV Securities: Reform still
needed in Vietnam's state-owned enterprises, WORLD FIN. (Feb. 6 2017),
http://www.worldfinance.com/inward-investment/asia-and-australasialbidv-securities-
reform-still-needed-in-vietnams-state-owned-enterprises [https://perma.cclK68B-226UJ]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017).
39. For a critical assessment, see generally, e.g., Wendy Leutert, Challenges
Ahead in China's Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, 21 ASIA POL'Y 83 (2016).
40. This policy is founded on the concept of socialist modernization and its
principal object to develop Chinese productive forces under the leadership of the
Communist Party to advance the development of the state and its population. See
generally, e.g., CHINA'S SOCIALIST MODERNIZATION (Yu Guangyuan ed., 1984)
(discussing China's transition to a socialist economy); QIZHI ZHANG, AN INTRODUCTION
TO CHINESE HISTORY AND CULTURE 441-67 (2015).
41. See Larry CatA Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party,
and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of
Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
101, 133-47 (2008); see also Jiang Shigong, How to Explore the Chinese Path to
Constitutionalism? A Response to Larry Catd Backer, 40 MOD. CHINA 196, 202-03
(2013).
42. See generally, e.g., Hongying Wang, A Deeper Look at China's "Going Out"
Policy, CIGI (Mar. 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/
hongying-wang-mar2016_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYQ7-B2T5] (archived Aug. 27,
2017).
43. See generally Chen Zhimin, Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese
Foreign Policy, 14 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 35 (2006).
44. "Major problems plaguing the entities uncovered through the inspections
include corruption, weakening of the Party's leadership, and procedural violations in
personnel selection and placement, according to the findings released by the CCDI on
Thursday." CCDI warns of corruption risks after inspections, Xinhuanet (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/englishI2016-02/05/c_135075770.htm [https://perma.cc/WS4Z-
T7PQ] (archived Oct. 22, 2017). See also (CPC Central Committee and State Council On
Creating a Healthy Environment for Entrepreneurship) 41#
http://politics.people.com.cn/nl/2017/0926/clOO1-29558449.html
[https://perma.cc/CT5L-KR2P] (archived Oct. 22, 2017).
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states in which China has invested heavily. Yet, even Chinese SOEs
are subject to the inefficiencies of operational objectives that include
goals beyond pure financial wealth maximization.45 And the Chinese
economic and political system is incompatible with a goal of complete
detachment between state (as regulator) and enterprise (including
finance and bank SOEs).46
Globalization has also had a profound effect on the character,
utility, and operation of SOEs.47 Once understood (like their private
counterparts) and targeted toward national markets, the possibilities
of cross-border economic activities and the development of complex
and strong production chains have pushed SOEs beyond their
borders.48 SOEs now compete with their private counterparts for
global business and are deeply embedded at all levels in global
production chains. This produces substantial issues around concepts
of competitive neutrality, grounded in fears that states could use
their political power to support the economic activities of their SOEs,
especially abroad.49 To that extent, they represent not merely the
45. See, e.g., China says debt risk for main state firms is controllable, THE Bus.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/china-
says-debt-risk-for-main-state-firms-is-controllable [https://perma.cc/J26N-W3B4]
(archived Sept. 6, 2017) ("While many state companies are bloated and inefficient,
China has relied on them more heavily over the past year to generate economic growth
in the face of cooling private investment.").
46. It has been suggested that
Given the long history of SOEs and the enormous social responsibilities
imposed on them, China's gradual approach to SOE reform is understandable.
Today, deficiencies in China's market infrastructure continue to prevent the
government from fully allowing free market forces to run the economy. The
government will continue, therefore, to have an important role to play in
resolving these transition problems in China's development.
See Fan Gang, supra note 9, at 3.
47. See generally Ian Bremmer, The New Rules of Globalization, HARv. Bus. REV.
(Jan.-Feb. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/01/the-new-rules-of-globalization [http://perma.ccf
CZ8S-PAZR] (archived Aug. 24, 2017); Hao Liang et al., An Anatomy of State Control in the
Globalization of State-Owned Enterprises, 46(2) J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 223 (2015) (considering
golabalization's effect on SOEs).
48. See, e.g., DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN 33 (2004).
49. See, e.g., OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES, STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY 9 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/daf/
competition/46734249.pdf [http://perma.cc/82KA-23X3] (archived Aug. 24, 2017) ("Due
to their privileged position SOEs may negatively affect competition and it is therefore
important to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible consistent with their public
service responsibilities, they are subject o similar competition disciplines as private
enterprises."); Antonio Capobianco & Hans Christiansen, Competitive Neutrality and
State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options 3 (OECD Corporate
Governance Working Papers No. 1, 2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
governance/competitive-neutrality-and-state-owned-enterprises_5kg9xfgjdhg6-en
[https://perma.cc/GY8F-UEYB] (archived Sept. 17, 2017).
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willingness of SOEs to access growth potential beyond the state, but
also the willingness of states to leverage their power through SOE
projection in private markets. But sometimes, SOEs tend to
substitute for foreign state macroeconomic planning rather than
serving in market driven transactions. This appears especially
important where SOEs from larger states are used to project public
policy through ownership of resources of developing states. Again in
Peru, in 2013, Petrobras, a Brazilian SOE, sold its Peruvian assets to
a PetroChina, a Chinese SOE.50
Despite the growing impact of SOEs in global economic
activities, there has been little successful effort to manage their
behaviors in the international sphere.5 1 That is, there is little by way
of law to govern those governance gaps5 2 that exist when SOEs (like
other economic enterprises) operate between states in ways that
make it impossible for a single state to assert effective regulatory
oversight over the enterprise and its transactions.5 3 There have been
some multilateral efforts that have produced soft law,54 the most
important of which has been the OECD's Guidelines on Corporate
Governance of SOEs.5 5 These have sought to develop principles of
conduct touching on seven areas of governance.5 6 The thrust of these
50. REVERDITTO, supra note 34.
51. See OECD, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AS GLOBAL COMPETITORS 27
(2016), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/finance-and-
investment/state-owned-enterprises-as-global-competitors_9789264262096-
en#.WTNqHcm1tPM [http://perma.cc/C326-2S7X] (archived Aug. 24, 2017).
52. See John G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary General,
Protect, Respect, Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Human
Rights Council of the United Nations, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (April 11, 2008). But
see PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 154 (2014) (discussing
2013 reporting standard imposed on SOEs involved in extractive projects). See
generally Tara J. Melish & Errol Meidinger, Protect, Respect, Remedy and Participate:
'New Governance' Lessons for the Ruggie Framework, in THE U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 303, 305-06
(Radu Mares ed., 2011).
53. I have considered this in the broader context of transnational public
economic activity with a focus on China. See Larry Cati Backer, Sovereign Investing in
Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned
Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 8
(2010) (discussing regulatory oversight over Chinese SOEs in the context of
transnational public economic activity).
54. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 422 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman &
Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 198 (2010).
55. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 11.
56. These include: I. Rationales for state ownership; II. The state's role as an
owner; III. State-owned enterprises in the marketplace; IV. Equitable treatment of
shareholders and other investors; V. Stakeholder relations and responsible business;
VI. Disclosure and transparency; and VII. The responsibilities of the boards of state-
owned enterprises. Id.
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guidelines is to ensure that SOEs operate like their private
counterparts-that is, to mitigate the public character of these
enterprises.5 7 The reasons are obvious-SOEs that are more public
than private in character may be viewed as political institutions and
barred from entry into foreign states. And the sovereign immunity
regimes of most states distinguish between public regulatory actions
and activities and commercial activities.58
Even as the character and use of SOEs has been changing and
adjusting to the potentials and risks of global activity, the
international community has also sought to develop ever stronger
mechanisms for the management of the character of such activity
with respect to human rights, sustainability, and fidelity to the
numerous international instruments that have sought to develop
global consensus norms about economic behavior.5 9 Efforts to create a
more effective legal structure to embed human rights obligations onto
SOEs have recently focused on trade agreements. However, these
efforts have produced little by way of substantive changes to date.
One of the targets has been in the discussion about the construction
and implementation of bilateral trade agreements.6 0 A related effort
has been undertaken around multilateral agreements. 6i The
57. See id. ¶T III-IV.
58. The issue of sovereign immunity is of long standing. See John G. Hervey,
The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed
Solution, 27 MICH. L. REV. 751, 774 (1929). The issue of sovereign immunity became
particularly pressing after 1945 when emerging Western markets systems confronted
Soviet state based economic activity. See Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Sovereign
Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV. 614, 634 (1950); Michael
Brandon, Sovereign Immunity of Government-Owned Corporations and Ships, 39
CORNELL L. Q. 425, 442 (1954); George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The
Current Legal Framework for Enforcing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments against
States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 665, 671 (2008). See generally A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, Sovereign
Immunity and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against State Entities: Recent
Trends in Practice, in AM. ARB. ASS'N HANDBOOK ON INT'L ARB. PRAC. 338 (2010),
http://www.academia.edul519348/Sovereign Immunity-and.theEnforcementofArbit
ralAwards-againstStateEntities RecentTrendsinPractice [http://perma.cc/BZD4-
XQTR] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).
59. See, e.g., CAMILLA WEE, REGULATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES: TENDENCIES OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2008).
60. See, e.g., Paul Blyschak, State-Owned Enterprises and International
Investment Treaties: When are State-Owned Entities and their Investments Protected?, 6
J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 1, 14 (2011); Norah Gallagher, Role of China in Investment:
BITs, SOEs, Private Enterprises, and Evolution of Policy, 31 ICSID REV. 88, 93 (2016);
Junji Nakagawa, Regulatory Harmonization Through FTAs and BITs: Regulation of
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 55,
2012), https://ssrn.comlabstract=2103237 [http://perma.ccl8DQZ-K939] (archived Sept.
7, 2017).
61. See, e.g., Ines Willemyns, Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises In TPP:
Have Expectations Been Met? 15-18 (Leuven Ctr. for Glob. Governance Studies,
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difficulty tends to focus on issues of equal treatment and on the scope
and application of duties, as well as on the inclusion of SOEs (and
sometimes of SWFs) as investors in such arrangements.6 2
Beyond those trade related efforts, most other projects have been
directed toward formal lawmaking and to the development of "soft"
normative principles. Among the international frameworks that have
been most influential are those that have been developed for
managing behaviors that touch on human rights impacts of economic
activity. These are to be distinguished from older efforts aimed
generally at the legalization of the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) of enterprises.6 3 CSR frameworks tend to be state-based and
focused on the structures of corporate governance and institutional
obligation to society. The debates touch on the primacy of shareholder
versus stakeholder benefit models of corporate operation,64 and they
have generally found expression in national law through the
management of corporate philanthropy.65 In contrast, the debate is of
Working Paper No. 168, 2016), https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/
working-papers/new series/wp 161-170/wp- 168-willemyns-website.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H88P-WJZG] (archived Aug. 25, 2017) (discussing the rules placed on
SOEs at the multilateral level).
62. See, e.g., Yuri Shima, The Policy Landscape for International Investment by
Government-controlled Investors: A Fact Finding Survey 10 (OECD, Working Paper No.
2015/01, 2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/the-policy-
landscape-for-international-investment-by-government-controlled-
investors_5js7svpOjkns-en [https://perma.cc/ZNF9-TAVE] (archived Sept. 17, 2017).
63. I have noted at greater length elsewhere on the differences between CSR
and business and human rights:
At its broadest, it refers to the extent to which an aggregation of capital that is
recognized as a separate legal person must, may, or should, operate in
accordance with certain standards of conduct. That mimics the general
conversation a society has about the legal, civic, ethical and societal obligations
of its citizens. But . . . CSR has acquired a quite specific and distinct meaning.
It references the question of the extent of the legal, social, civic and moral
obligations of enterprises in their operations. . . . CSR has also become a key
element of international debates. . . . But the debate is of a substantially
different character. In this context, the principal focus was on the developing
normative structures for human rights.
Larry CatA Backer, The Corporate Social Responsibilities of Financial Institutions for
the Conduct of their Borrowers: The View from International Law and Standards, 21
LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
64. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169
(1954) (discussing the stakeholder benefit model of corporate operation); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (University of Chicago Press 1962); see
generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (providing a
more recent defense of the arguments against the doctrine of corporate social
responsibility).
65. Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
United Nation's Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a
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a substantially different character where the obligations of economic
activity are considered in an international framework. In this context,
the principal focus is on the developing normative structures for
human rights. This approach is partly structural, in the sense that
global governance has tended to be constructed around the pillars of
democracy, respect for human rights, and economic development.66
These international frameworks center around a few key
instruments, two of which are especially influential. The first is the
UNGP,67 introduced earlier, which the U.N. Human Rights Council
unanimously endorsed in 2011.68 The other is the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises (MNE Guidelines). 69 The MNE
Guidelines have existed in one form or another since the 1970s and
constitute recommendations addressed by governments to
multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries.
Their object is to provide a soft law framework "for responsible
business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws
and internationally recognised standards."7 0
The UNGP are structured as three "Pillars": the First Pillar is
the state duty to protect human rights,7 1 the Second Pillar is the
responsibility of corporations to respect human rights, 72 and the
Third Pillar is the remedial mechanism that must be established to
implement the state duty and corporate responsibility.7 3
SOEs occupy a dual place within the UNGP. They are to some
extent an instrumentality of the state and thus potentially subject to
the state duty to protect. At the same time, they function as
commercial ventures and are thus subject to the less legalized
Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility as International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 287, 294-306 (2006).
66. See, e.g., What is CSR?, AUSTRALIAN CENTRE FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, http://accsr.com.au/what-is-csr/ [https://perma.cclV2NQ-UQQ9]
(archived Aug. 25, 2017) ('The view of CSR as a global governance mechanism emerges
from the global trans-national institutions that developed in the twentieth century,
such as the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, The World Bank
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), together
with international treaties and agreements negotiated by governments and non-
government organisations.").
67. UNGP, supra note 6.
68. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011),
https:/fbusiness-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/medialdocuments/un-human-rights-
council-resolution-re-human-rights-transnational-corps-eng-6-jul-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6CH-QF9R] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
69. ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), https://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6Z9-4QQK] (archived Aug. 26, 2017)
[hereinafter MNE GUIDELINES].
70. Id. at 3.
71. UNGP, supra note 6, at 3.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id. at 27.
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provisions of the corporate responsibility to respect. Yet their owners
have a duty in exercising their ownership responsibilities that may
also be constrained by the state duty to protect human rights. In the
context of SOEs, UNGP paragraph 4 has proven most relevant,
providing that states take "additional steps to protect against human
rights abuses" by their SOEs or with respect to entities that receive
substantial state support in other ways.74
The provisions of the UNGP have been substantially
incorporated into the OECD framework through its MNE Guidelines.
These are also non-binding, but they incorporate a remedial
mechanism in the form of "special instances" (complaints) that may
be lodged by individuals and others against enterprises alleging
violation of the MNE Guidelines before a "National Contact Point," an
administrative office maintained by states to comply with their
OECD member state obligations.7 5
While these efforts have yet to produce legally binding
instruments, they have produced increasingly influential systems of
soft law. And irrespective of these soft-law instruments, global
enterprises have sought to manage their global operations through
governance mechanisms that span their production chains, drawing
in substantial part on these international instruments.
Since UNGP endorsement in 2011, a Working Group on Business
and Human Rights, established at the time of the endorsement, has
undertaken formal international engagement with the UNGP.76 The
Working Group and the OECD recently have been considering
application of multilateral soft-law frameworks to hybrid entities-
SWFs and SOEs. The object is to extend the scope of the UNGP and
the MNE Guidelines, but also to make the application of those
instruments more coherent. At the same time, they have been
following a policy of encouraging states to "lead by example,"
74. Id. at 6.
75. The National Contact Points (NCP) are as close as soft law frameworks
have come to development of an enforcement framework. OECD states and otherwise
adhering governments are obliged to establish NCP and vest them with authority
under the OECD MNE Guidelines to advance the objectives of the OECD corporate
governance project, and most importantly serve as a mechanism through which
allegations of violations of the MNE Guidelines may be raised. See MNE GUIDELINES,
supra note 69, at 71-74 ("The National Contact Point will contribute to the resolution
of issues that arise relating to implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances in
a manner that is impartial, predictable, equitable and compatible with the principles
and standards of the Guidelines."); see generally Larry CatA Backer, Rights And
Accountability In Development (Raid) v. Das Air and Global Witness v. Afrimex; Small
Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of
Multinational Corporations, 10 MELB. J. OF INT'L L. 258 (2009).
76. See Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsa
ndotherbusiness.aspx [https://perma.cc/3AHR-58KG] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
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supported in this endeavor by Nordic states7 7 especially in the context
of their efforts touching on SOEs and human rights.
This focus was augmented by the theme adopted by the Working
Group for the 5th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights,
November 14-16, 2016.78 One of the most important products of that
approach was the delivery, during the summer of 2016, of the Report
of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises (the 2016 WG Report).79 It
focused on the application of the UNGP framework to the governance
obligations of both SOEs and their owners. The "Note by the
Secretariat" explained the reason for the centrality of this theme:
In the report, the Working Group examines the duty of States to protect
against human rights abuses involving those business enterprises that they
own or control, which are generally referred to as State-owned enterprises....
The report calls attention to and clarifies what States are expected to do in
their role as owners of enterprises and why. . . . In the present report, the
Working Group suggests a range of measures that States could take to
operationalize the call to take additional steps with regard to State-owned
enterprises, by building on existing international guidance and national
practices related to the corporate governance of those enterprises.
8 0
The press release announcing the 2016 WG Report explained the
focus and scope of the effort.8 1 It started with a reminder of an
important premise-that states are also economic actors in their own
right. Those economic activities, the management of which has been
refined over the course of the last century, under conditions of
77. And principally the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, Government
Offices of Sweden. See OHCHR, Leadership and Leverage: Embedding Human Rights
in the Rules and Relationships that Drive the Global Economy, 2016 UN Forum on
Business and Human Rights Forum Programme,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ Business/ForumSession5/PoWprintable.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8EDX-8XX8] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
78. See 2016 United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/2016ForumBHR.aspx
[https://perma.cc/T7X7-76ZF] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) [hereinafter OHCHR, 2016 UN
Forum]. The UN Human Rights Council, under paragraph 12 of its resolution
17/4, established the Forum to serve as a key global platform for stakeholders to
"discuss trends and challenges in the implementation of the Guiding Principles and
promote dialogue and cooperation on issues linked to business and human rights." It is
guided by the Working Group on Business and Human Rights.
79. U.N. Secretariat, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/32/45 (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter WG, 2016 Report].
80. Id. at 1.
81. See State-owned Enterprises Must Lead by Example on Business and
Human Rights - New UN Report, OHCHR (June 17, 2016) [hereinafter OHCHR,
SOEs],
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=20123&Lang
ID=E [https://perma.cc/F6ED-CJUB] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
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globalization and the emerging normative structures of international
human rights norms, now require states and their SOEs to lead by
example. But currently SOEs appear to lag behind the private sector
in embedding human rights sensibilities in their operations. And this
is important as the state economic sector is now quite large.82
"Governments are currently sending an incoherent message to
businesses," said human rights expert Dante Pesce, who chairs the
U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, during the
presentation of the group's latest report to the U.N. Human Rights
Council. "On the one hand, they ask private businesses to respect
human rights, and increasingly set out such expectations in law and
policy," Mr. Pesce noted. "On the other hand-barring notable
exceptions-they show no great desire to use the means at their
disposal to ensure that those enterprises they own or control respect
human rights."83
The 2016 WG Report gives itself an ambitious goal: "It is high
time for States to show concrete leadership, and require the
enterprises they own or control to be role models on human rights,"
the expert stressed. "Doing so is part of States' international legal
obligations, and it will only reinforce the legitimacy of States'
expectations towards private businesses."84
This Article examines the emerging issues of the human rights
duties of states as owners of SOEs, and of the responsibilities of SOEs
for their own human rights-related conduct, through the lens of the
2016 WG Report for the purpose of engaging with its premises and
suggestions. The 2016 WG Report represents a very needed focus on
one of the more difficult challenges for the UNGP. The state duty to
protect differs from the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights. The differences present some complexity when it is the state
itself that operates the enterprise, directly or indirectly. It is to those
issues that the 2016 WG Report, and the analysis that follows, are
directed.
The analysis is also informed by the proceedings of the Working
Group discussions on SOEs held at the annual U.N. Forum on
Business and Human Rights, which took place at the UN
headquarters in Geneva (Palais des Nations) from November 14 to
16, 2016. 85 These proceedings are considered in light of two
82. Id. ("Many States the world over manage large portfolios on State-owned
enterprises (SOEs), which have risen as significant actors in the global economy, active
at home and abroad in diverse sectors such as energy, utilities, infrastructure,
transports, telecommunications, and banking. The proportion of SOEs among Fortune
Global 500 companies has grown from 9.8% in 2005 to 22.8% in 2014, with US $389.3
billion of profit and US $28.4 trillion in assets.").
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. OHCHR, 2016 UN Forum, supra note 78.
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particularly important developments. The first is the substantial
change in the direction of US policy in trade and globalization.8 6 Its
abdication of a retreat from robust multilateralism and the
cultivation of a project of nationalist bilateralism has changed the
dynamic within which policy globally may develop. The second
development is China's project of outbound nationalism-the One
Belt One Road policy-which relies to some extent on the projection of
commercial power through Chinese SOEs.8 7
Part II develops a deep analysis of the 2016 WG Report,
interrogating its conceptual framework and its implementation
programs. Part III then briefly considers the work left to be done,
from conceptual lacunae to implementation. It consists of a set of ten
challenges and recommendations for further development. These
recommendations and challenges suggest that issues of corporate
personality, sovereign immunity, asset partition, and regulatory
compartmentalization may well hobble the work of embedding human
rights within the operation of states as owners and SOEs as public
enterprises. More importantly, it demonstrates the shortcomings of
the current strongly held consensus that the focus of regulatory
governance must be grounded in and through a formally constituted
enterprise, the SOE, rather than focusing regulation on economic
activity irrespective of the form in which it is undertaken. Until these
conceptual issues are considered, the regulation of economic
activities-SOEs, supply chains, multinational corporations-will
remain elusive.
86. See Larry Catd Backer, Ruminations 70: American Anti-Multilateralism
and the Prospects for a Comprehensive Treaty for Business and Human Rights, LAW AT
THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 8, 2017, 8:44 PM), http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/
ruminations-70-american-anti.htm1 [https://perma.cc/3KCX-WRP9] (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (considering the effects of the US rebooting its policy in trade and globalization);
Larry CatA Backer, The 45th Presidency and Multilateral Treaties--Fear, Loathing and
a Repudiation of 20th Century Americanism, LAw AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 2,
2017, 10:53 PM), http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/the-45th-presidency-and-
multilateral.html.
87. See TDM Call for Papers: Special issue on "China's One Belt, One Road:
Economic Changes, Power Shifts and Prospects / Consequences for the World of
Arbitration", TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT. (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=1652 [https://perma.cc/MWD9-AT521
(archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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II. CHALLENGING ENGAGEMENT AND ENGAGEMENT CHALLENGES
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 2016 WG REPORT
A. Foundations: SOE CSR and Human Rights Compliance
The legal framework for SOE governance remains substantially
underdeveloped at national and international levels. 88 That is
especially the case with respect to the general CSR and the more
specific human rights duties and obligations of SOEs, of their owners,
or of the state financial instrumentalities through which they are
supported. At the national level, two approaches are probably the
most influential. The first is the Nordic model.89 The other is the
Marxist-Leninist SOE model now best developed in China.9 0 Beyond
these models, states have developed and operate SOEs along policy
lines that advance national political frameworks.
The Nordic SOE model is well illustrated by looking at Sweden
and Norway. In Sweden, the state is a significant owner of
enterprises operating in Sweden and abroad. The Swedish state
controls, wholly or partially, forty-eight enterprises, two of which are
listed on public exchanges. 91 Moreover, the Swedish government
accepts the responsibility to be an active and professional owner, with
the general objectives of generating value and in some cases ensuring
that public policy assignments are adequately performed.9 2 Besides
88. Ironically, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, recently abandoned by the
United States, included an attempt to develop multilateral approaches to SOE
regulation. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
(SOES) 1 (2015) ("TPP's State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) chapter ensures that
businesses, regardless of ownership, compete fairly through enforceable rules to ensure
that foreign-owned SOEs compete on the basis of quality and price, not on the basis of
discriminatory regulation, subsidies, or favoritism."). On the abandonment of the TPP
by the United States, see Memorandum from President Donald Trump to the U.S.
Trade Representative, Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United
States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-
regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific [https://perma.cc/DMK6-UK2K]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017). For commentary, see Larry Cati Backer, "Let's Make a Deal"
as Economic Policy, JURIST (Dec. 29, 2016), http://jurist.org/forum/2016/12/Backer-
lets-make-a-deal.php [https://perma.cc/Q4C4-YH2U] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
89. See discussion infra p. 846-47 and notes 91, 92.
90. See discussion infra p. 847-48 and notes 100, 102.
91. See State-owned Enterprises, GOV'T OFFICES OF SWED.,
http://www.government.se/government-policy/state-owned-enterprises/
[https://perma.cc/5VUL-Z6MC] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) ("In addition, two business
foundations are administered. In total, the state-owned enterprises employ
approximately 137 000 people. The estimated total value of the state company portfolio
amounts to SEK 510 billion.").
92. See Objectives for State-owned Companies, GOVT OFFICES OF SWED. (Nov.
27, 2014), http://www.government.se/government-policy/state-owned-enterprises/goals-
for-state-owned-companies/ (last updated March 10, 2015) [https://perma.cc/AT5C-
EXDG] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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this overall goal, Swedish SOEs are tasked with multiple objectives,
including obtaining balanced gender distribution, reaching economic
goals, satisfying reporting requirements, ensuring sustainable
enterprises, and ensuring completion of assigned public policy
assignments tasked to some Swedish SOEs.9 3 Furthermore, Swedish
SOEs are managed and developed by an organization of the Ministry
of Enterprise and Innovation that specializes in corporate governance
and company management. 94 This management "is conducted in
accordance with the State's corporate governance documents,
compiled in the State's Ownership Policy," which includes Swedish
Code for Corporate Governance, board nomination process, financial
targets process, sustainable business, guidelines for remuneration,
and guidelines for external reporting.9 5 Finally, governing boards of
Swedish SOEs are made up of approximately 282 board members.9 6
Similar to Sweden, Norway plays a very active ownership role.
In fact, the state "has direct ownership, managed by the ministries, in
70 companies. The total value of the state's commercial ownership
was estimated to around NOK 644 billion at year-end 2015.""9 Much
like Sweden, the Norwegian state recognizes the importance of
transparent, responsible corporate governance and recognizes
adherence to generally acceptable principles of corporate
governance.9 8 Similar to the Swedish approach, Norwegian SOEs are
primarily tasked with generating as much revenue as possible and, in
the case of a certain category of SOEs, achieving sectoral policy
objectives."
The Marxist-Leninist model is best illustrated by the
organization and functions of Chinese SOEs. First, Chinese SOEs
make up 80 percent of the value of the Chinese stock market, and the
Chinese government is the biggest shareholder in the 150 largest
Chinese corporations.0 0 The Chinese government, furthermore, has
announced SOEs in the last twenty months "involving 6.9 trillion
yuan ($1 trillion) of assets in what's shaping up to be the biggest
93. See id.
94. How the companies are managed, GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF SWEDEN (July
17, 2015), http://www.government.se/government-policy/state-owned-enterprises/how-
the-companies-are-managed/ [https://perma.cc/GQ8E-TUZ5] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND FISHERIES, THE STATE
OWNERSHIP REPORT 2015, at 5, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/
b7e367d388ba41dd839f34d64cOe4cc1/the-state-ownership-report-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AT7U-CJ2M] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
98. See id. at 25.
99. See id.
100. Ming Du, China's State Capitalism and World Trade Law, 63 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 411 (2014).
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overhaul of SOEs since the 1990s." 101 The Chinese central
government owns 106 companies (forty-seven of which ranked in the
2014 Fortune Global 500), which are referred to as yangqi.102 These
companies are concentrated in the industries of defense, petroleum,
and electricity, among others, and they participate extensively
abroad, including in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative.10 3
Yangqis historically have been controlled by government
ministries and other state organizations; however, in 2003
administration of these SOEs was centralized under the State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 104
China officially divides its SOEs into two groups. "The first is a core
group of 53 firms known as important backbone state-owned
enterprises (zhongyao gugan guoyou qiye)." The second group,
"comprises the remaining firms-a varied mix of global industry
players" and "state-run research institutes."05 The former group of
SOEs is ranked at the vice-ministerial level, which gives its top
executives equivalent administrative rank with political elites. The
latter group of SOEs has department-level rank. Importantly, while
"SASAC states that administrative rank does not matter for how
yangqi are managed and assessed, in practice it is critical to the
political influence of both these firms and their leaders."106
Where reform of the SOE sector, as was seen in the Nordic
model, is about leveling the playing field between SOEs and private
enterprises, the Chinese model is different. Here the emphasis is on
reform and efficiency in the service of state macroeconomic
objectives-objectives which require SOEs to become much more
nimble and variable in their scope and operation. Consider for
example that China sought to drive innovation by calls on SOEs for
leadership in the development of new forms and practices of well-
targeted economic activity. 107 As a consequence, the movement is
toward "tightening, not loosening, its grip over government
enterprises, with some modifying their bylaws to give the Communist
Party more oversight of management decisions."08 At the heart of
these new reforms is categorizing SOEs "into a public class (gongyilei)
101. Colin Simpson, China's Reform of SOEs May Look a Little Odd to the West:
Goldman, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-09-08/goldman-sachs-sees-chinese-soe-reform-just-not-as-west-knows-it
[https://perma.cc/6ZY7-893W] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
102. Leutert, supra note 39.
103. Id. at 86-87.
104. Id. at 87.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. State Council People's Republic of China, SOEs join tide of mass innovation
(Feb. 21, 2017), http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2017/02/21/content_281475
573951833.htm [https:/perma.cc/M2Z4-FTDK] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
108. Simpson, supra note 101.
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and a commercial class (shangyelei). 109 "Firms will be divided by
function into those dedicated to public welfare and those seeking
profit."1 10 However, reforms will be carried out separately for the two
groups: "distinct strategic objectives will be set for each, and their
performance will be evaluated by different metrics."11
Beyond national models, developing multilateral frameworks
have tended to bring SOEs within their frameworks. This is
especially the case in the context of the human rights obligations of
business activity.112 Among the most important is the UNGP. In
particular, UNGP paragraph 4 provides: "States should take
additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business
enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State, or that receive
substantial support and services from State agencies such as export
credit agencies and official investment insurance or guarantee
agencies, including, where appropriate, by requiring human rights
due diligence."113
Beyond the substantive norms of the UNGP, OECD's Guidelines
on Corporate Governance of SOEs seeks to structure SOE governance
in a manner that aligns it with private enterprise corporate
governance norms.114 Addressed to government officials in charge of
the ownership of the enterprises, they set out seven guidelines"5
related to the corporate governance of SOEs, which aim to: "(i)
professionalise the state as an owner; (ii) make SOEs operate with
similar efficiency, transparency and accountability as good practice
private enterprises; and (iii) ensure that competition between SOEs
and private enterprises, where such occurs, is conducted on a level
playing field."116 The guidelines begin with the rationales for state
ownership, stating that state ownership should be exercised in the
interest of the general public."x 7 Therefore, the main purpose of an
SOE should be to "maximise value for society, through an efficient
allocation of resources."1 8
109. Leutert, supra note 39, at 85.
110. Id.
ill. Id.
112. For a discussion see, e.g., UTNGP, supra note 6.
113. Id. at 3. ("Where a business enterprise is controlled by the State or where
its acts can be attributed otherwise to the State, an abuse of human rights by the
business enterprise may entail a violation of the State's own international law
obligations. Moreover, the closer a business enterprise is to the State, or the more it
relies on statutory authority or taxpayer support, the stronger the State's policy
rationale becomes for ensuring that the enterprise respects human rights.").
114. See OECD GUIDELINES supra note 11, at 34.
115. See id. at 17-27.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Id. at 17.
118. Id.
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The guidelines proceed with the states' role as owners and
recommend that states act as informed and active owners.11 9 This
guideline, moreover, calls for simplicity and standardization of legal
forms, operational autonomy, respect for the SOEs' independence,
clear identification of ownership rights, and accountability for the
enterprise. 120 The second guideline ends with the prime
responsibilities for state owners, built around the principle that "the
state should act as an informed and active owner, ensuring that the
governance of SOEs is carried out in a transparent and accountable
manner, with a high degree of professionalism and effectiveness."1 21
The guidelines also set out a governance principle for SOEs in
the marketplace. The principle, "the legal and regulatory framework
for SOEs should ensure a level playing field and fair competition in
the marketplace when SOEs undertake economic activities,"122 is
structured around legal compliance and autonomy objectives. This
guideline recommends clear separation between the state's ownership
function and other state functions; access to remedies through
unbiased legal or arbitral tribunals; high standards of transparency
regarding cost and revenues; disclosure and funding of costs related
to public policy objectives; enforcement of general laws, tax codes, and
regulation for SOEs; engagement in public procurement; and market
conditions for access to debt and equity.123
The guidelines continue with a principle on the equitable
treatment of shareholders and other investors, which recommends
that SOEs should recognize the rights of all shareholders and ensure
their equitable treatment and equal access to corporate information.
This guideline also recommends that states fully implement the
OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance,124 that listed or unlisted
SOEs adhere to corporate governance codes, and that they inform
non-state shareholders when SOEs are required to pursue public
policy objectives.125
The fifth guideline deals with stakeholder relations and
responsible business. It recommends that the state policy recognize
the SOEs' responsibilities to stakeholders and that they require SOEs
to report on these relations.126 The guideline further recommends
that all parties (governments and SOEs) respect stakeholders' rights,
large SOEs report on these relationships with stakeholders, boards
119. Id. at 18.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 18-19.
122. Id. at 20.
123. See id. at 20-21.
124. See OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en [https://perma.cclWC55-PTWS].
125. See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 22.
126. Id. at 23.
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maintain measures to prevent corruption and fraud, SOEs "observe
high standards of responsible business conduct," and SOEs not be
used as vehicles for financing political activities.127
The sixth guideline deals with disclosure and transparency,
recommending that SOEs observe high standards of transparency
and that they subject themselves to "the same high quality
accounting, disclosure, compliance and auditing standards as listed
companies." 128 The guideline then provides several reporting
recommendations, including that SOE financial statements be subject
to an independent external audit and that states publish annual
reports on SOEs through web-based communications.2 9
Finally, the last guideline sets out recommendations regarding
the responsibilities of SOE boards. It recommends that SOEs have
competent boards, with clear mandates, and recommends several
courses of appropriate corporate behavior for the boards of SOEs.130
The U.N. Working Group and the OECD are seeking to apply
multilateral soft law frameworks to hybrid entities-SWFs and
SOEs. 131 The project poses substantial challenges, whatever the
framework. Among them are traditional and systemic corruption,13 2
and inefficiency. 33 More broadly, SOEs might represent an element
of systemic corruption of the global trade system, built around the
fear that SOEs represent projection of public power by other
means.134 Yet there is also the developing notion that SOEs can serve
as premier vehicles through which legalization of CSR and human
rights responsibilities might be undertaken.'3 5 As Dante Pesce, a
member of the Working Group noted:
127. See id.
128. Id. at 24.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 26-27.
131. See infra Section II.B.
132. See, e.g., Wenhao Cheng, An Empirical Study of Corruption within China's
State-owned Enterprises, 4 CHINA REV. 55-80 (2004); Marcelo Pontes Vianna, Brazilian
State Owned Enterprises: A Corruption Analysis (Fall 2014), https://www2.gwu.edu/
-ibilminerva/Fall2014/MarceloVianna.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2VE-7VQH] (archived
Sept. 17, 2017).
133. See, e.g., Wildau, supra note 16 (describing the heavy emphasis on the old
growth model in Chinese SOEs).
134. See ALAN P. LARSON & DAVID M. MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
NATIONAL SECURITY: GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT 21 (2006), https://www.cfr.org/
sites/default/files/pdfl2006/07/CFIUSreport.pdf [https://perma.ccl98AV-PAP7] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017) ("In certain cases, government ownership and control can create
national security issues, particularly when the foreign company's decisions become an
extension of the government's policy decisions rather than the company's commercial
interests.').
135. See, e.g., Dante Pesce, Chairperson, Working Grp. On Bus. & Human
Rights, Address at the 32nd Session of the Human Rights Council (June 16, 2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplavNews.aspx?NewslD=20122&Lang
ID=E#sthash.T78hnrS4.dpuf [https://perma.cc/5V3U-J7LA] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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Broadly speaking, the measures the Working Group suggests are of two types:
(a) first, the WHAT - what should be States' expectations and requirements
with regard the enterprises they own or control when it comes to human
rights?; and (b) the HOW - i.e. the concrete tools, policies and measures States
could take to ensure their human rights requirements are implemented. Let me
flag now some of the most important measures we suggest.1 3 6
These considerations served as the basis for the development of one
approach to the embedding of SOEs within the normative projects of
business and human rights. In the process they raised a number of
important normative considerations that touch not just on the specific
project of business and human rights obligations of SOEs, but also on
fundamental issues concerning the continued viability of distinctions
between the public and private activities of the state.
B. The 2016 Working Group Report
1. Introduction to Analysis
The following discussion of the 2016 WG Report is offered to
push the excellent work of the Working Group and its Secretariat
further along the lines they themselves admirably, and to a great
extent courageously, have framed so well. The 2016 WG Report
represents an important and necessary step in the construction of a
more unified approach to the application of the UNGP. It provides a
means of thinking critically about the way that states and enterprises
ought to better coordinate, and in the case of SOEs connect, the
duties of the First Pillar with the responsibilities of the Second Pillar.
The Report also suggests the scope and direction of the work that
remains to be done. It is to that effort that the engagement in this
Summary Report is directed. But make no mistake, the comments
and observations offered in the analysis that follows ought not to be
read as a criticism of the 2016 WG Report or as a suggestion that it is
somehow flawed or that it fails. Quite the reverse. Without the
pioneering conceptual work in this strong 2016 WG Report, the
analysis that follows would not be possible.
The 2016 WG Report is organized in four sections. Section I (a)
considers the background, aims, and outline of the report, (b) defines
an SOE for its purposes, (c) considers the role of SOEs in the larger
global economy, and (d) defines the scope and limits of the report.3 7
Section II then focuses on the normative policy framework that
the Working Group advances as underpinning its notion of state
action in relation to SOEs.3 8 It considers (a) the state duty to protect
136. Id.
137. WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, at 3-7.
138. Id. at 7-12.
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against abuses by SOEs, (b) the SOE's own Second Pillar obligations
independent of the state's duty under national and international law,
and (c) the possible link between corporate governance and human
rights.
Section III is the most ambitious-laying out the Working
Group's framework for operationalizing the state's duty under UNGP
paragraph 4.139 That framework, mirroring the structure of human
rights due diligence itself, involves (a) setting expectations, (b)
instituting mechanisms to set and manage expectations through
ownership arrangements, (c) developing the relationship between the
state and SOE boards of directors, (d) ensuring oversight and follow
up mechanisms, (e) instituting capacity-building obligations, (f)
imposing human rights due diligence obligations on SOEs, (g)
instituting disclosure requirements, transparency and reporting, and
(h) developing effective remedies.140
Finally, Section IV provides a brief conclusion and more
extensive recommendations. 141 The recommendations are directed
separately to states, SOEs, national human rights institutions,
international organizations, the UN human rights system, civil
society, academia, and business organizations.
Each is considered briefly in turn. The object is to get a sense of
the model developed, the consequences for implementation of the
emerging normative structures of business and human rights at the
international level, and the critical challenges that this approach and
these implementation strategies produce.
2. Section I: Introduction 42
a. Background, Aims, and Outline of the Report
The 2016 WG Report emphasizes the somewhat narrow focus of
the report: "the duty of states to protect against human rights abuses
involving those business enterprises that they own or control." 143
Though they also acknowledge the independent duty of SOEs under
the UNGP, even that autonomous responsibility must be understood
as exercised in the shadow of the state. SOEs are, as a matter of
convenience, and within the presumptions of law, sometimes treated
as independent juridical persons. Yet the relationship with the state,
as "owner," is qualitatively distinct from ownership by non-state
actors. It is that "special relationship" that must be harmonized
139. Id. at 12-20.
140. UNGP, supra note 6, at 17.
141. WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, at 20-23.
142. Id. at 3-7.
143. Id. at 1.
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within the logic of the UNGP, a task that is made more difficult
precisely because of the dual character of the state with respect to its
SOEs. The state serves simultaneously as the "owner" of the SOEs
(and an object of law like other owners), and as the regulator of SOEs
(the generator of the laws that are applied to SOEs within their home
states). In the transnational sphere, that fluidity becomes more
complex:144 SOEs are usually characterized as instrumentalities of
(foreign) states to which exceptions to rules of sovereign immunity
may apply, and they also serve as conduits through which states may
project their own laws, norms, and policies by the exercise of their
leadership of SOEs. Where states own a significant interest in
enterprises that are domesticated in foreign states, the relationship
becomes even more complex-here the notion of SOE converges with
the issues of SWFs and the duties of states as investors.145 And these
multi-spatial dualities of the relationship among SOEs and states
might have been better captured in the 2016 WG Report.
Following the logic of the UNGP, the 2016 WG Report adopted a
coordinated compartmentalization approach-one that builds on the
autonomy of each of the Pillars (protect, respect, remedy) but then
seeks an overall coordination in their inter-relations. That is a very
useful means of making sense of the UNGP as applied. But it also
leaves certain questions dangling. The heart of that
compartmentalization is found in UNGP paragraph 4. It is around
this "additional steps" principle that the Working Group will build its
framework for the human rights-related relationship among states
and the SOEs they own or control. "Policies, guidelines and good
practices are lacking at both the national and international levels.
Governance and protection gaps exist, which must be addressed."146
And thus, there are two objectives of the 2016 WG Report: first to
clarify "what States are expected to do," and second to suggest "a
range of measures that they could take to operationalize" the
"additional steps" requirements.14 7
The 2016 WG Report is grounded in independent investigation
and also in the responses of a number of states to a questionnaire
that was distributed by the WG.148 A number of important SOE-
driving states responded. But so did a number of important states for
which SOEs may be viewed with suspicion. It was a pity that one of
144. Larry CatA Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the
21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TIBURG L. REV.
177 (2012).
145. Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational
Rule of Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 122 (2013) [hereinafter Backer, Soveriegn Investing].
146. WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, at 93.
147. See id. at 3.
148. Id. at 4 n.2.
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the most important drivers of contemporary SOE practice, China, did
not. At some point it will be necessary to embed China more robustly
in these efforts, if they are to remain relevant in fact and form.
b. Defining State-Owned Enterprises
Conceptual issues of definition are deceptively easy, and in the
case of SOEs even more so. Yet a robust definition of SOEs for
purposes of regulation, that is of distinguishing one sort of ownership
structure from another for the purpose of the application of legal
requirements, has not proven to be easy. The 2016 WG Report avoids
the issue by relying on the definition of the OECD Guidelines on
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises,149 which are self-
described as providing "an internationally agreed standard for how
governments should exercise the state ownership function to avoid
the pitfalls of both passive ownership and excessive state
intervention."5 0
The focus is a blend of formal and functional characteristics. For
the formal requirements: The SOEs must be recognized by some
national law as (1) an enterprise (2) in which the state (3) exercises
ownership. The object is to avoid distinguishing among the forms
with which aggregations of capital may be organized for the purpose
of engaging in concerted activity. Ownership and control are
understood by reference to both formal conveyance of authority and
the effectiveness of control in certain "marginal situations." The
definition is meant to include minority ownership where effective
control is exercised, but in a nod to SWFs, it excludes minority
ownership under 10 percent. Additionally, transitory ownership is
excluded. These are political concessions, to be sure, that may tend to
weaken the conceptual unity of the Guidelines.
For the functional requirements: the SOEs (1) as part of their
purpose or activity (2) must engage in activity of an economic nature.
In the OECD principles (embraced in the 2016 WG Report) the
definition of economic activity has a certain old fashioned feel to it.
The notion of economic activity is built around the offer of goods or
services on a given market "which could, at least in principle, be
carried out by a private operator in order to make profits."151 At its
core, however, the definition of economic activity presents a curious
nod to static historicism: "Economic activities mostly take place in
markets where competition with other enterprises already occurs or
149. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 11.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 15.
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where competition given existent laws and regulations could
occur."15 2
c. State-Owned Enterprises: State of Play
The 2016 WG Report makes the case for the continued
importance of SOEs in the globalized economy post-1980s.15 3 And
indeed, despite the denationalization of enterprises in Europe after
the 1970s, the emergence of complex supply chains now makes their
operation relevant again worldwide.154 The discussion of the rationale
for SOEs is interesting,15 5 though one best left to the public policy of
states. It is important to note, however, that the rationale reflects
modern OECD thinking and European sensibilities1 56 but may not
adequately reflect the underlying importance of SOEs for
contemporary Marxist states like China. Again, it is a pity that China
chose not to participate more vigorously. But all of this serves as the
necessary justification for the object of the 2016 WG Report, one that
is certainly hard to argue with 1 57-the continuing importance of
SOEs within global production chains and their relationship to states
makes China's lack of responsiveness to human rights-based concerns
all the more troubling. And those relationships make the case for the
embedding of human rights-related concerns in the operation of SOEs
all the more compelling.
d. Scope and Limits of the Report
Perhaps it is because the 2016 WG Report makes such a strong
case for the more vigorous embedding of human rights concerns in
both state practice and SOE operation that the limitations of the 2016
WG Report are most troubling. First, the 2016 WG Report focuses
narrowly on SOEs "in the traditional sense."1 58 In that respect the
OECD definition is both a sword and a shield, providing narrow
clarity but avoiding issues of coherence. That is lamentable. More
importantly, the compartmentalization of SOEs as a factor apart
permits a distinction to be made between SOEs, on the one hand, and
SWFs, on the other.1 5 9 It is not clear that this is necessary as a
matter of theory or conceptualization, apart from political
considerations. More importantly, perhaps, this
152. Id.
153. WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶ 12.
154. Id. ¶ 13.
155. Id. ¶ 14.
156. Id. ¶ 15.
157. See id. ¶ 16-17.
158. See id. ¶ 19.
159. See id. ¶ 19.
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compartmentalization (investment versus direct economic activity)
produces a division between the state's oversight of SOEs and its
investment-related activity also embedded in UNGP paragraph 4:
export credit agencies, investment insurance or guarantee agencies,
and development-related agencies (§ 18).
At the surface there is an appeal to this segmentation of
analysis. Each form of public engagement with economic activity has
its distinctive characteristics. Yet from the perspective of managing
governance with respect to a singular normative system, conceptually
these distinctions are without difference with respect to the duty of
states. They are different with respect to their consequences for the
object of state duty. And indeed, this unnecessary constraint,
grounded perhaps in an unfortunate conflation of the differentiation
among Second Pillar organizations (as objects of state duty) and what
should be a unitary approach to state duty, may produce a missed
opportunity of conceptual advances of state behaviors under the
UNGP First Pillar. The 2016 WG Report nods in that direction.16 0 It
is hoped that at some point there will be a greater exploration of
those issues as the conceptual basis of the First Pillar is deepened.
3. Section II: Normative and Policy Framework Underpinning
State Action in Relation to SOEs16 1
a. State Duty to Protect against Abuses by SOEs
The 2016 WG Report starts with its conception of the regulatory
governance framework within which the state's duty must be
understood: "States should do more than simply treat State-owned
enterprises as any other business enterprise."16 2 This "do more than"
standard is then embedded within the "additional steps" principle of
UNGP paragraph 4.
To start, the 2016 WG Report adopts the view that "do more
than" means "in addition to the duty of states generally under UNGP
paragraphs 1-3," applicable to the state's relation with all
enterprises.163 That is, the ownership or control relationship adds
another layer of duty beyond the general duty as a regulator. It takes
comfort in the development of parallel thinking within the Council of
Europe,164 though, again, a non-European perspective might have
added depth-especially, for example, as China in particular is
160. See id. ¶ 21.
161. Id. at 7-12.
162. Id. ¶ 22.
163. See id. ¶ 23.
164. See id. ¶ 24.
860o [VOL 50:827
2017] HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
assuming a much larger and more critical driving force in the
realities of economic activity (and ultimately its rules and structures).
However, the 2016 WG Report emphasizes as well that this "do
more" standard goes to means and not to substance. The object is to
avoid abuse. "The ultimate goal is to achieve full respect for human
rights by all enterprises, irrespective of ownership."165 Yet, as will be
seen, that uniformity of respect becomes incoherent in the face of a
state duty that varies among states and that tends to be narrower
than the full extent of the human rights responsibilities of business.
That produces an awkwardness that remains unexplored. For
example, may a state that defines its duty under international law to
exclude the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)166 ensure that its SOE abide by its policy position, even in
its operations in foreign states, consistent with this rejection of the
Covenant?
The 2016 WG Report then offers a number of policy rationales
for its position. These include the notion that ownership provides the
state with greater leverage for monitoring an ensuring respect for
human rights. Implicit here is the recognition that at its limit, the
SOE is an instrumentality of the state and as such ought to be
subsumed within its governance matrix.16 7 In addition, the rationale
of "policy coherence" is offered, with reference to UNGP paragraph 8
and its call for internal governmental policy coherence.16 8 That is true
enough, though it has equal applicability to the state duty (through
UNGP paragraphs 1-3) to all enterprises. Yet it also raises the
difficult issue of the disjunction between the scope of the enterprises'
responsibility to respect human rights6 9 and the limits of a state's
legal duty under international law applied within its domestic legal
order with respect to those human rights norms and instruments
domestically legalized (UNGP: "Nothing in these Guiding Principles
should be read as creating new international law obligations, or as
limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have
undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to
human rights"). Last, "the 2016 WG Report suggests a basis for
augmenting the legitimacy of states and for strengthening the impact
of "reputational risk" on states that are less influenced by their duty
to protect human rights.170
165. Id.
166. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, http://www.ohchr.org/
en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [https://perma.cc/EJ3E-QECQ (archived Aug.
29, 2017).
167. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, 1 26.
168. See id. ¶ 27.
169. See UNGP, supra note 6, ¶ 12.
170. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶ 28.
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Finally, the 2016 WG Report considers the international law
implications of its application of the "do more" standard and its
implementation through "additional steps." 171 They look to the
thinking of UN treaty bodies. Most interesting, again, is the
tendency, at the limit, to conflate the SOE with the state
("considering such enterprises as quasi-State organs or agents and
assuming that they are wholly owned or controlled by the State").172
And indeed there is much merit to this line of reasoning, as it reflects
some substantial jurisprudence within the logic of the EU treaties
and especially its state aid jurisprudence. 173 Yet it has equal
applicability to emerging Marxist SOEs.i74 However, that line of
reasoning does not necessarily square with the notion of the dual
nature of the SOE as both an autonomous enterprise (the OECD
approach) and a state instrumentality (the EU jurisprudential
reasoning and Marxist approach). Perhaps the problem lies not in
conception but in consequences. To some extent these distinctions
arise from the need to figure out a way to avoid the constraints of the
principle of sovereign immunity. Yet it seems odd that sovereign
immunity principles ought to drive the conceptualization of the
human rights in business conduct project of the UNGP. And the
result is policy distortion in the pursuit of coherence and legal
harmonization. Perhaps it is time to detach sovereign immunity from
SOE human rights duty/responsibility concepts.
Paragraph 33 speaks to this issue obliquely by considering the
extent of the state duty where the SOE performs public functions.
This is the edge of the conceptual constraints of the OECD SOE
definition on which the reasoning of the Report itself is based. Here,
the Report offers a hint that at the limit, again, the SOE
responsibility to respect human rights merges into the state duty to
protect. This suggests most importantly that the UNGP Pillars are
hierarchically arranged, and that the state duty pillar invariably
supersedes the corporate responsibility pillar when the two share
governance spaces. Yet this produces the contradiction mentioned
earlier. Where the scope of the state duty is considerably narrower
than the autonomous corporate responsibility to respect, the result is
a diminution of the scope of human rights consideration rather than
an augmentation. There might be little comfort in the knowledge that
what this narrowing "buys" is "legalization" of the obligation-to the
171. See id. ¶f 29-34.
172. See id. ¶ 32.
173. See Backer, supra note 19, at 33.
174. Larry Cati Backer, Central Planning Versus Markets Marxism: Their
Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and
Economy, 32 CONN. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2017).
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extent that the state itself permits remedial mechanisms for its own
failure of duty under the First Pillar.
And yet the 2016 Working Group has a point. UNGP paragraph
23 makes clear that the enterprise's responsibility to respect human
rights may be subject to and limited by the constraints of the states in
which enterprises operate. UNGP paragraph 23 Commentary notes
that "Where the domestic context renders it impossible to meet this
responsibility fully, business enterprises are expected to respect the
principles of internationally recognized human rights to the greatest
extent possible in the circumstances, and to be able to demonstrate
their efforts in this regard." What this suggests is that where there is
contradiction between the constraints of the state's duty and the
corporate responsibility, states may indeed limit compliance with
Second Pillar requirements to the extent they are inconsistent with a
state's domestic legal and constitutional order. On the other hand, in
cases where there is no conflict-for example, where the state duty is
more limited than the scope of the responsibility to respect, but the
two are not inconsistent-enterprises do have a responsibility to
embed human rights under the Second Pillar beyond the legal
requirements of the First Pillar. For SOEs that may mean, for
example, that Chinese SOEs may be required to ensure respect for
the provisions of the ICCPR when operating abroad to an extent quite
different from its application in its home state.
Lastly, paragraph 34 of the 2016 WG Report notes the possibility
of state liability for SOE breaches where the acts of the SOE can be
attributed to the state. Of course, as an instrumentality of the state,
in theory, all acts of the SOE ought to be attributed to the state. Here
again, the intersection between complicity, attribution, and sovereign
immunity rules distorts rather than clarifies the relation and
muddies the analysis. The 2016 WG Report offers a facts and
circumstances approach that largely reflects consensus thinking. But
these conceptual conflations and distortions produce a potentially
important liability that is not considered. Consider the following
possibility: an SOE with its own independent and autonomous
responsibility to respect human rights is found to have breached an
obligation under the ICCPR. Because of the nature of the relationship
between SOE and state, that breach can be attributed to the state.
But the state in question has not incorporated the ICCPR in its
domestic legal order. Under these circumstances the SOE has
breached its responsibility, but has the state breached its duty? This
can be seen as a back door way of imposing international law on
states otherwise unwilling to consent to its adoption. But states will
tend to reject this as inconsistent with international law. Or it
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suggests a jus cogens175 character to the International Bill of Human
Rights that is belied by the contemporary political realities. More
likely that attribution may make the case for reducing the scope of
the SOE corporate responsibility so that it aligns with the scope of
the state duty. Yet that would do a disservice to the UNGP project
and emphasize a fracture of corporate responsibility under the Second
Pillar grounded on the ownership relationship between the enterprise
and the state.
b. The SOEs as Business Enterprises: the Corporate
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights
It is somewhat ironic, given the possibilities inherent in the
reasoning of the 2016 WG Report paragraph 34, to then turn to the
extent of the SOE responsibility to respect human rights under the
Second Pillar of the UNGP.176 But this is irony with an important
purpose. It is a strong reminder in the 2016 WG Report that the
Second Pillar matters, its scope of responsibility is autonomous of the
state duty, and it applies in equal measure to both private and public
enterprises-including the most state-identified SOEs.1" And indeed,
there is a point in noting that SOEs do carry the imprimatur-and
thus the ethical and public purpose-burdens of the state, especially
of transparency, accounting, disclosure, ethics, and compliance-
including, but not limited to, legal compliance.1 78
These premises cannot be underestimated in importance. For
though some of the preceding section of the 2016 WG Report might be
read to suggest not mere convergence but the subsuming of the
Second Pillar within the duty framework of the First Pillar, the
Working Group here makes it clear that this ought not to be the case.
Yet the result of this dual obligation for SOEs can pose significant
disjunctions. The most important of these-those touching on the
scope of rights-has already been discussed. But it matters. States
will not be eager to have their SOEs apply international law under
the Second Pillar that the state itself has rejected as a legal
obligation under international law (and thus falling outside of the
state duty). Alternatively, any implication that the state duty to
protect human rights extends to instruments that do not bind states
as a matter of international law likely would be rejected by a large
number of states. These include those human rights that (1) are not
175. See generally THOMAS WEATHERHILL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND SOCIAL CONTRACT (2015).
176. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶¶ 35-37 ("[I]t is clear that Principles
11 to 24, applicable to pillar II of the Guiding Principles, . . . . fully and equally apply to
State-owned enterprises.").
177. See id. T 35.
178. See id. T 36.
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legally binding, (2) reflect international norms inconsistent with the
constitutional or political principles of a specific state, or (3)
constitute the unilateral legalization of such law to states that have
neither ratified nor transposed treaties and related documents
evincing legal affiliations.
It is not clear, however, that the possibility of opting out of the
Second Pillar, implied by the 2016 WG Report on the basis of a
"performs public functions" standard, 179 is consistent with the
implications of the UNGP or its underlying philosophy. There is a
little tension between that notion and the expression of the broad
scope of the application of the Second Pillar to SOEs "regardless of
whether they are purely commercial or related to specific public
purposes."1 80 The UNGP are meant to frame the way that human
rights ought to be deeply embedded within the structures of economic
activity. To add contingencies about the scope and manner of that
protection on the basis of the character of the activity is at best ill
advised. First, the "performs public functions" standard is itself
ambiguous. Public functions are understood quite differently
depending on the political economy of a state, its traditions, and its
operations. Moreover, such a standard is at best difficult to
implement and monitor. The U.S. Supreme Court's efforts to
distinguish between traditional governmental functions and ordinary
economic activity proved too difficult a task to undertake in any sort
of principled way, and the task becomes even more complicated when
the jurisdictional limits of sovereign immunity statutes are added to
the mix. 18 1 Adding the complication of differences among states, the
resulting variation in the scope of coverage might well be used to
undermine the coherence of the human rights project itself. It might
be more useful to continue to focus on the character of the activity-
whether or not it constitutes economic activity-and base distinctions
on that criterion alone. And indeed, the OECD's own definition of
SOEs has already embraced that view.
c. Link between Corporate Governance and Human Rights
The 2016 WG Report also seeks to make the case for a strong
link between corporate governance and the human rights project.
This is consistent with the position of international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank, and of multi-lateral
organizations, principally the OECD. And it reflects the notion that
the management of the parameters of the internal governance of the
179. See id. ¶ 33.
180. Id. ¶ 37.
181. For the classic cases, see, e.g., OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S.
(2015); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
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corporation is intimately tied to the way in which the corporation
itself manages its behaviors with other stakeholders, especially with
their environmental and human rights effects. And yet, like these
other institutions, the WG had to be quite careful to avoid offending
that core principle of corporate governance-the shareholder or
institutional welfare maximization theory that underlies the whole of
the structures of corporate law and the principles of corporate
governance. While the issue of who the corporation serves remains a
hotly contested one, the consensus among enterprises and OECD
states remains the same as it was in the early part of the last
century-the corporation serves its shareholders through its
institutional activities. While that may provide "play at the
joints" 18 2-long or short term time horizons, the ability to work
toward aggregate shareholder welfare maximization, the ability to
consider a host of factors in making the calculation (not just a narrow
band of traditionally considered financial factors and the like)-the
fundamental principle remains undisturbed.
And thus, in making the business case for business and human
rights, and in making that case for the SOE, the 2016 WG Report
faces the same constraints as have others who have sought o manage
behaviors without running afoul of this basic principle. 183 As a
consequence, when considering corporate governance, one falls back-
as one always falls back-on market and societal mechanisms for
effective disciplining of corporate action, including the shape and
operation of its governance regimes. The best one can do under these
circumstances is what states have started to do in greater and more
effective measure: (1) regulatory governance regimes in which
corporate governance is nudged through objectives based regulation
(principally relating to corruption, the institution of effective
monitoring and surveillance mechanisms, and the reporting of their
effective use); and (2) markets disciplining disclosure and
transparency regimes (the UK Modern Slavery Act' 84 and the Dodd
Frank Act paragraph 1502 Conflict Minerals rules'85 are two cases in
point).
182. This is a reference to a "catch phrase" from the constitutional jurisprudence
of the Religion Clauses. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Play in the Joints Between the
Religion Clauses' and Other Supreme Court Catachreses, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1331
(2006). On the issue of who the corporation serves, see, e.g., Backer, Multinational
Corporations, Transnational Law, supra note 65.
183. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, TT 40, 43-44.
184. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2015/30/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/JA2Z-C3V9] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
185. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For a discussion, see Specialized Corporate
Disclosure, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last updated Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml
[https://perma.cc/4JKB-L9WF] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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The most interesting addition is the additional role for the state
as the owner or controlling shareholder of the SOE. There is a sense
that state conduct that transforms corporate governance to a
mechanism through which the state (owner) may "spell out and
implement their expectations that State owned enterprises respect
human rights"186 is troubling to the extent that it suggests a singular
lack of enterprise autonomy. On the other hand, it is also troubling to
the extent that state ownership can give rise to a corporate
governance model for SOEs that is appreciably different from that
applicable to private enterprises. These more aggressive suggestions
are to be distinguished from the "active ownership"
recommendation. 187 Principles of active ownership have been
pioneered-not in the governance of SOEs but in the management of
the investments of SWFs. The Norwegian model provides a nice
example.'8 8 It suggests the strong convergence between SOE and
SWF models-in the governance context (another reason it was a pity
that SWFs were excluded in this report).
4. Section I11189
Section III is the most ambitious-laying out the Working
Group's framework for implementing the theoretical justification and
conceptual framework developed in Sections I and II. That
framework, mirroring the structure of human rights due diligence
itself,1 90 is centered around a "range of measures that States, as
owners of companies, could take to operationalize their obligations
under [UNGP] principle 4." 191 Each of the eight measures is
considered quite briefly:
186. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶ 41.
187. See id. 1 42.
188. See, e.g., Norway's Active Attitude to Corporate Governance, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://bit.ly/1J7Ejax [https://perma.cclRDX2-XDQV] (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (praising Norway's oil fund as a beacon to other such funds); June Rhee,
Sovereign Shareholder Activism: How SWFs Can Engage in Corporate Governance,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 2014/08/07/sovereign-shareholder-activism-how-swfs-
can-engage-in-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/3Q8U-5AHWI (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (recognizing Norway as the most prominent model). See generally Backer,
Sovereign Investing, supra note 145.
189. WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, at 12-20.
190. See UNGP, supra note 6, ¶ 17.
191. Id. ¶ 45.
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a. Setting Expectations
The initial measure, setting expectations, is both natural and
necessary. Yet it is often overlooked. But one must consider this in
two respects. First, the SOE ought to set expectations under the
framework for enterprises contained in the Second Pillar
responsibility to respect human rights. Second, the state, as the
owner (controlling stakeholder), must set expectations in its role as
owner. This is to be distinguished from the state regulating. Here the
state duty does not extend to the legalization of its relationship as a
shareholder to its SOE, but rather extends to the construction of a set
of decisions with respect to its operating rules as a shareholder and to
its management of its ownership interests. The difference is subtle
but necessary. The former goes to UNGP paragraphs 1-3. The latter
goes to the policy and operational obligations suggested in UNGP
paragraph 4.
This is especially important, as the 2016 WG Report notes, in the
elaboration of national CSR guidelines.1 9 2 But as the 2016 WG Report
rightly notes, there is a distinction between CSR guidelines and the
incorporation of business and human rights elements within them.
Mere CSR codes that do not reference the UNGP framework or
otherwise elaborate its principles are of little good, even for managing
the reputational risk of states.19 3 And the idea of operationalizing the
"role model" function of SOES19 4 is laudable.
More problematic are the suggestions of extraterritoriality
suggested by the "setting expectations" mechanisms1 9 5 with respect to
the prevention of human rights abuses abroad by reference to the
policies and laws of home states. This problem is magnified when the
home state is both regulator and owner or is operating through an
instrumentality organized in corporate form. There is a very thin line
between projections of economic activity abroad and projections of
state power abroad through the medium of institutions organized as
SOEs. At worst, this sort of approach will make it harder for SOEs to
operate outside their home jurisdiction.19 6
192. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶ 47.
193. See id. ¶ 49.
194. See id.¶ 51.
195. See id. T 49.
196. Committee on Foreign Investment in U.S. (CFIUS), U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/CFIUS/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2FEF-JTCM] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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b. Instituting Mechanisms to Set and Manage Expectations
through Ownership Arrangements
The 2016 WG Report follows the OECD here to good effect.
Expectations set and established by the state (but note here also
those expectations that ought to be set by the SOE under the Second
Pillar as well, a distinction missing from the Report) should be
publicly disclosed, "and mechanisms for their implementation be
clearly established."'9 7 To that end the Report falls back on a number
of its alternative approaches-its National Action Plan project,
responsible business conduct policy and state conduct policies with
respect to their ownership interests. The most useful mechanism
considered is the suggestion for the centralization of ownership
supervision within the state.198 In China, the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
(SASAC), a special commission directly under the State Council, is
responsible for managing SOEs.199 It is important to clarify which
institutional actor within the state can exercise ownership rights, and
to specify the norms those organs must apply in exercising ownership
and control. On the other hand there is always the danger of adding.
an additional layer of bureaucracy, with its consequences for policy
coherence and its danger for democratic accountability. The more
remote the ownership facility, the less accountable it may be to either
the state organs or the people.
c. Developing the Relationship between the State and SOE
Boards of Directors
The 2016 WG Report constructs an interesting relationship
between the state, as owner, and the boards of directors, as the
incarnation of the SOE as an autonomous institution. To avoid the
potential implications of conflating state and enterprise, the 2016 WG
Report posits the SOE board as a sort of conduit for state direction
but also as the institution that protects the SOE from absorption into
the state. The method selected for this careful balancing is a "comply
or explain mechanism."20 0 This makes excellent sense and draws on
the notions of regulatory governance in a useful way. Here the SOE
remains free of direct control but must also satisfy the owner either
that its preferences have been met or that they have been considered
197. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶ 55.
198. See id. ¶ 57.
199. Main Functions, STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMIN.
COMMISSION OF THE ST. COUNCIL,
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/nl408O28/nl4O8521/index.html [https://perma.cc/H89R-9SKJ]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017).
200. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, 1 61.
869
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
and rejected. On the other hand, it is unlikely that in an SOE context
"comply or explain" would ever produce a situation where the SOE
board did not comply.
That suggests that this method might be less effective than it
appears as a means of protecting the autonomy of SOEs, especially
where the state has set up an aggressive and vigorous program of
oversight and direction. The latter may especially be the case in
political systems grounded on ideologies that advance socialist
modernization or related principles. In these cases, "comply or
explain" combined with supervisory and support mechanisms, 201
control of board nomination and evaluation, 202 and efforts at
managing the gender equality of the board2 03 may effectively reduce
autonomy to a formality. If that is the case, then the question
emerges again-the extent to which the SOE, as a state
instrumentality in fact, is required to comply with the responsibility
to respect in addition to serving as the expression of the state's duty
to protect human rights to the extent of the state's legal obligations
under international law and otherwise in the state's discretion.
In addition, it raises another concern-where the state oversight
of the board of directors is so complete, there is a question of its
compliance with OECD Principles. But more importantly, it opens the
SOE to issues of veil piercing-the doctrine in many jurisdictions that
presumes that an enterprise is solely liable for its own obligations
and entitled to the sole use of its assets, unless the enterprise is
found to be a sham, or the enterprise is deemed to be the alter ego of
the state. A state owner whose control is extensive enough may be
deemed to have assumed both the authority for and the obligations of
the enterprise. In that case, the state as well as the enterprise may be
liable. Yet if that is the case, the state could seek to avoid liability by
invoking sovereign immunity principles. And here, again, in this
context, it suggests the perverse effects of the OECD definition of
SOEs limited by the formal requirement of separate incorporation.
The human rights effects of economic activity are not a function of the
form of that activity but of the activity itself-whether the result of the
conduct of a private enterprise, an SOE, or the state. Economic
activity, in whatever form, ought to be subject to the corporate
responsibility to respect, and where appropriate, to the state duty. The
embrace of the more antiquated framework will continue to bedevil
both conceptual and implementation issues.
201. See id. ¶ 62.
202. See id. ¶ 63.
203. See id. ¶ 64.
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d. Ensuring Oversight and Follow Up Mechanisms
The 2016 WG Report again turns to principles of regulatory
governance in suggesting methods for SOE oversight and follow up
mechanisms. And again, the consequences of these might produce
either special legislation or rules for SOEs-a consequence that is at
odds with the equal treatment principles of the OECD Guidelines and
the UNGP-but they might also substantially reduce SOE autonomy
to the point where the SOE and the state merge.
Specifically, and following the lead of the Council of Europe,204
the 2016 WG Report suggests that "[s]tates should evaluate measures
taken and respond to any deficiencies as necessary, including by
providing adequate consequences."205 To that end it is suggested that
states "set up-or at a minimum require that SOEs adopt-explicit
human rights targets, and monitor their achievement in the same
manner and with the same mechanisms used for sustainability
targets."206
There is an interesting wrinkle to this proposal. It suggests that
value maximization for SOEs departs from the traditional calculus of
profitability using generally accepted accounting principles and
instead adopt a broader interest maximization model grounded in the
maximization of "value to society."2 07 That value, it is assumed, would
be measured in relation to the targets imposed, though it is not clear
how they would be measured. To that end, perhaps, the 2016 Report
also suggests the creation of systems of ownership meetings and
dialogues 2 08 and the use of assessment ools with more detailed
human rights related criteria.209 Lastly, the state could also use
independent review and audit mechanisms.210
All of these are quite laudable suggestions. One wonders,
however, about the costs of compliance and their effects both on
productivity (of the SOE) and the institutional capacity (of the state)
to actually and appropriately engage in these activities robustly and
over a long period of time. It is easy enough for rich states with
complex and well-seasoned bureaucracies to begin to work through
these institutional mechanisms, but poorer states, especially those
downstream in supply chains-where a number of human rights
related violations may occur-may not be in a position to do more
than give lip service. And that returns to privatization-the need to
204. See id. ¶ 65.
205. Id.
206. See id. T 67 (referencing the experiences of some states with respect to the
latter at T 66).
207. See id. T 68.
208. See id. T 69.
209. See id. ¶ 70.
210. See id. ¶ 71.
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delegate these functions with SOEs or to private certification and
monitoring institutions, delegate them up to international
organizations, or permit states chartering apex SOEs to intervene
downstream more directly. Any of these alternatives is likely to be
unacceptable.
e. Instituting Capacity-building Obligations
Its discussion of oversight and monitoring brings the 2016 WG
Report inevitably to capacity building.21 1 Capacity building is focused
on building the capacity of SOES212 and the nature of international
standards, national expectations, and appropriate systems building.
But it also relates to capacity building focused again on SOEs with
respect to multi-stakeholder initiatives 213 including international
public mechanisms. These are important areas of capacity building.
Yet it is as important to note that states themselves may require
substantial efforts at capacity building and the funds necessary to
effectively commit resources to the development of capacity. Indeed,
with respect to the state duty to protect human rights through SOE
ownership, the critical question becomes the capacity of states-as
much as the capacity of SOEs-to work effectively within these
human rights frameworks. It is not clear that this has been
addressed, especially for low and middle income states and states
with weak or thin governmental structures. More will have to be done
to avoid capture by larger, richer states and the problems of
projection of national interests and views downstream to poorer,
weaker, and less prepared states.
These efforts might also find ties with corruption, an area of
emerging human rights-based conduct.214 The issue of corruption
runs not just to those affected by corruption in its various forms, but
also goes to the heart of the legitimacy of state oversight and SOE
operation. Corruption thus can be understood both as a form by which
government capacity is threatened, and as a cluster of actions that
themselves contribute to human rights threats to stakeholders. The
global scandals of property seizures for land deals through the misuse
of official discretionary authority provides a case in point.215 There
211. See id. ¶¶ 72-73.
212. See id. ¶ 72.
213. Id. ¶ 73.
214. See David Kinley, A New Human Right to Freedom from Corruption 3-4
(Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 14/12, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=2393205 [https://perma.cc/8Z7M-VWT9] (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (demonstrating how a state's tax laws can be used to shift wealth from taxpayers
to wealthy executives in SOEs and create a system of "legal corruption").
215. See generally OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE AND GLOBAL WITNESS TAINTED LANDS: CORRUPTION IN
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are substantial overtones to the discourse and challenge of corruption
in the context of state investment in enterprises through SWFs. In
that respect the approach of the Norwegian Pension Fund Global
might be instructive, for both its efforts to develop substantive norms
and the difficulties of coherent application of those norms.216
f. Imposing Requirements of Human Rights Due Diligence
The key issue for the state under UNGP paragraph four's
"additional steps" standard appears to revolve in some key respects to
the question of mandating human rights due diligence (HRDD) for
SOEs. Under the corporate responsibility to respect Pillars,
enterprises have a responsibility to conduct HRDD, but there is no
legal obligation to do so. States, of course, are free to impose the
requirement. Most have not. But the issue becomes acute where the
enterprise is state owned. The 2016 WG Report shies away from a
recommendation of mandatory HRDD for all SOEs as a baseline.
Instead they move back to the traditional encouragement
standard.2 1 7 But they also point to regimes where HRDD for SOEs
are mandatory and, in addition, suggest that States define the
criteria under which they will require SOE HRDD. 2 18 That is an
important step in the right direction.
g. Instituting Requirements of Disclosure, Transparency, and
Reporting
It is in the context of disclosure, transparency, and reporting
that the 2016 WG Report makes its strongest points. It notes the
trends toward regimes of greater transparency and disclosure for all
enterprises relating to matters of economic, social, and environmental
significance.219 On that basis it recommends "that States take the
additional step to systematically require the enterprises that they
own or control to report on environmental, social and human rights
performance." 220 Companies should follow an established
methodology.221 Though here, of course, the issues of coordination
and analysis loom large. In the absence of a uniform standard the
LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS (2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-
deals/tainted-lands-corruption-large-scale-land-deals/ [https://perma.cc/6HED-AH5S]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017).
216. See Larry Catd Backer, Incoherence or Discretion in Corruption and
Investment Approaches?, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://cbackerblog.blogspot.com.aul2016/02/incoherence-in-corruption-and.html
[https://perma.cclAGF3-LMMQ] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
217. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶T 75-77.
218. Id.
219. See id. IT 78, 79.
220. Id. ¶ 80.
221. Id. T 81.
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disclosure may be difficult to compare across industries and between
companies in the same sector. Perhaps some greater coordination on
disclosure methodologies would be useful for SOEs as well.
h. Developing Effective Remedies
The issue of remedies has been a difficult one for the UNGP
project. Both the Working Group and the Office of the High
Commissioner have devoted efforts, sometimes coordinated, to the
problem of the integration of remedial mechanisms with the
conceptual and framework structures of human rights norms,
including but not limited to the UNGP. This remains very much a
work in progress. Part of the problem, of course, is that the
conversation is usually directed downward, from elites in powerful
states and their coordinates in "downstream" states to governmental
organizations. These elites-well-educated and well-off members of
an increasingly coherent intellectual, social, and economic class-
tend to work for, but rarely with, the objects of remedial measures.
The problem is of course one of representation, coordination, and
engagement with significant obstacles.22 2 The problems are magnified
in the case of SOEs. Here the obligation of the state in its own right
ought to be paramount-that at any rate is an implication of the
organization of the Third Pillar of the UNGP. At the same time, the
SOE as an instrumentality of the state, sometimes more and
sometimes less connected with the governmental apparatus, ought to
have a heightened responsibility precisely because of that connection,
which is absent in the case of private enterprises. Yet even this
premise is complicated where SOEs of one state operate in the
territory of another. In that case, they represent both an
instrumentality of the state, a guest in the territory of another, and a
commercial venture with few of the advantages of state power.
Within this difficult conceptual context, the 2016 WG Report
seeks to chart a middle ground-but one focused especially on the
home country relationships between an SOE and its state owner.
They start with the premise that access to remedy ought, as an initial
matter, to advance an equal treatment principle,22 3 at least with
respect to the state duty to protect within its territories. The Report
then elaborates on the nature of the specific manifestation of that
duty with respect to the SOE.
As the owner of state-owned enterprises, the state should make
sure that: (a) the enterprises it owns or controls do not obstruct
222. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Fractured Territories and Abstracted
Terrains: The Problem of Representation and Human Rights Governance Regimes
Within and Beyond the State, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 61, 94 (2016).
223. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, 1 83.
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justice; (b) the enterprises cooperate fully with judicial and non-
judicial grievance mechanisms; and (c) the enterprises fully comply
with their responsibility to respect human rights, including providing
remediation for human rights abuses that they may be causing or to
which they may be contributing.224
These recommendations are then applied to the three main
categories of remedial mechanisms provided under the UNGP's Third
Pillar. With respect to state-based judicial mechanisms,225 the 2016
WG Report notes but does not resolve the issue of sovereign
immunity. It suggests a continuing role for immunity. But it is not
clear how preservation of the principle and protections of sovereign
immunity-running to either the SOE or the state as owner-
exercising the sort of oversight contemplated in this Report advances
in any respect the project of human rights protection. It certainly
works effectively to obstruct the availability of effective remedy, and
it reduces any real incentive for states to undertake their duty or for
the people (usually victims) to vindicate their rights through judicial
mechanisms. That is lamentable. Indeed, it is now time to consider
reversing the traditional premise of sovereign immunity as counter to
the spirit of the UNGP. It is now time to interpret the state duty as
requiring the waiver, most likely without exception, of sovereign
immunity for acts of state related to the operation of SOEs, and to
eliminate entirely the whole complex of sovereign immunity for SOEs,
whether operating within the state or abroad. The privilege of
operating in private markets, as enterprise or investor, ought to carry
with it all of the obligations, duties, and responsibilities of market
participants.
Lastly, the 2016 WG Report aptly describes the utility of state
based non-judicial remedies 226 and SOE-based grievance
mechanisms. 227 The continuing development of the connection
between the OECD's NCP process and its judicialization is to be
welcomed. 228 More focus, however, ought to be given to SOE
grievance procedures and especially to mechanisms for anticipating
issues and resolving them before loss occurs. To that end, there ought
to be a stronger connection, one implied in the UNGP, between
HRDD and grievance procedures.
224. Id. 1 84.
225. See id. ¶ 85.
226. See id. ¶ 86.
227. See id. ¶ 87.
228. See generally Larry Catd Backer, Rights and Accountability in Development
(RAID) v. Das Air and Global Witness v. Afrimex, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 258, 307 (2009).
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5. Section IV: Conclusions and Recommendations22 9
a. Conclusions
The conclusions draw together the conceptual insights around
which the Working Group would construct a framework for managing
the human rights-related relationship among states and the SOEs
they own or control.23 0 There is an emphasis on the distinct character
of the SOE responsibility to respect human rights and the state duty
to protect human rights. Yet those distinctions are sometimes blurred
even in the construction of the framework put forward in the 2016
WG Report. The difficulty is in compartmentalizing the role of the
state as a regulator and its role as an owner. Yet in a world in which
regulatory governance-market-based and principles-based
governance-is becoming more prominent, 231 such a
compartmentalization is neither easy nor necessary. It also
emphasizes the context-based approach to the development of the
state duty with respect to its role as SOE owner and specifically with
respect to the application of the "additional steps" specified in UNGP
paragraph 4. Yet more might be necessary to avoid the strategic use
of context to either avoid the state duty or to substitute it for the
sometimes broader scope of obligation under the Second Pillar. It is
true as well that states should lead by example. Yet until states get
their own houses in order-that is, until their own legal frameworks
are more compatible with international consensus standards-it will
be difficult to consider First Pillar duties important contributors to
the legal management of human rights in business activities.
b. Recommendations
The recommendations are directed separately to states, SOEs,
national human rights institutions, international organizations, the
UN human rights system, civil society, academia, and business
organizations. 232 Most of these are driven by the need to develop
systems of engagement and coordination among these relevant
stakeholders. And they rightly point both to the neglect of this
important area of business and human rights and to the need to
ensure that SOEs and private enterprises engage in the business of
human rights in an equivalent way. And yet there is a tension here as
229. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, ¶¶ 88-112.
230. See id. ¶¶ 88-94.
231. See Larry Cat6 Backer, Theorizing Regulatory Governance Within its
Ecology: The Structure of Management in an Age of Globalization, 23 CONTEMP. POL.
(forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2783018
[https://perma.cc/ HN29-HDRA] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
232. See WG, 2016 Report, supra note 79, T$ 95-112.
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well. Equivalence remains a difficult concept principally because the
nature of the ownership structures of public and private enterprises
make all the difference in the world. In effect, what the Working
Group appears to seek is functional equivalence. Yet in the face of the
inherent conflicts of interest that exist when a state owns some
businesses and regulates all, equivalence tends to be very relative
and will look different depending on the extent to which a state has
invested resources in SOEs and on the place of the state (and its
SOEs) in global production chains.
IV. THE WORK LEFT TO BE DONE: FROM CONCEPTUAL LACUNAE TO
IMPLEMENTATION
What might one learn from the 2016 WG Report? What work
might be left to be done in the wake of the powerful insights
developed in that Report? This Part briefly and perhaps somewhat
provocatively suggests challenges and sketches the work to be done
and the ways forward in the construction of a robust framework for
managing the human rights-related relationships among states and
SOEs.
A. Definitions Impede Efficient Regulatory Approaches
The reliance on the OECD SOE definitions and framework is
troublesome. That framework is altogether too strongly grounded in
European historicism and ignores the robust development of new
forms of SOE and SOE-state relationships within modern Marxist-
Leninist states. Moreover, this definitional approach-so severely
grounded in institutional formalism-tends to ignore and marginalize
the object of the regulatory management goals of this effort, which is
the management of economic activity in whatever form it is
undertaken.23 3 The institutional imperatives of the OECD and of the
2016 WG Report, tend to hobble the analysis and create substantial
conceptual complexities. Yet they remain critically important as
guides for states, especially developing states, as they seek to develop
their own legal and normative approaches to governmental economic
activity in SOE form.234
233. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Are Supply Chains Transnational Legal
Orders?: What We Can Learn From the Rana Plaza Factory Building Collapse, 1 U.C.
IRVINE J. INT'L, TRANSNAT'L, & COMP. L. 11, 66 (2016).
234. See Lei das Estatais - Pontos interessantes e inovagdes da nova lei das
estatais, JUSBRASIL (2016), https://meggielecioli.jusbrasil.com.br/artigos/360344232/ei-
das-estatais-pontos-interessantes-e-inovacoes-da-nova-lei-das-estatais
[https://perma.cclHQH5-8GQK] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (discussing how Brazil's SOE
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Form matters, to be sure. But in this case, one gets the sense
that definitions are constituted for the convenience of the regulator,
rather than to describe an existing phenomenon. State-owned
enterprises are inherently public in character, if only because of the
character of their owner. This is the case whether the SOE is entirely
owned and constituted by the state or is owned in partnership with
non-state organizations and individuals. A better approach might
start from the premise that economic activity owned or controlled by
the state, in whatever form organized, is the subject of both the
UNGP's First Pillar paragraph 4 and the Second Pillar. Economic
activity and not its forms should guide the framework that shapes the
First Pillar state duty to protect (as extracted from UNGP paragragh
4) as a direct obligation when undertaken within a home state, and
should be subject to the requirements of the Second Pillar when
undertaken abroad.
B. The Current Approach Exacerbates the Existing Disjunction
Between the Legal Duty of States and the Societal Responsibilities of
Enterprises
The current approach leaves undisturbed the startling
disjunction between the broad scope of responsibility to respect
human rights in the Second Pillar and the quite variegated scope of
state duty to protect human rights in the First Pillar . This
disjunction is only augmented where the state owns and operates
enterprises engaged in economic activity. The resulting contradictions
produce the opportunity to both "game" the oversight of human rights
activities and fracture any effort to produce uniformity in an
approach. In the context of the management of the global economy,
these are particularly important negative effects. Yet states are not
inclined to adhere to uniform international legal standards-localist
sovereignties tend to avoid efforts at harmonization. The only source
of such uniformity-the scope of the Second Pillar obligations of
enterprises-is effectively undermined by a state duty-based approach
to management. That irony produces farce.
The disjunction might be bridged by an approach that ensures
that the state duty extend down to its enterprises and that the
corporate responsibility ought to extend up to the state. However,
that bridging could expose other disjunctions, among them that the
framework is altogether too strongly grounded in European
historicism and ignores the robust development of a new form of SOE
and SOE-state relationship within modern Marxist-Leninist states.
States may indeed use their SOEs to advance both economic and legal
policy interests. States may seek to govern through their economic
law, Lei No. 13.303 (de 30 de junho de 2016) was revised in 2016 with no eye to issues
such as corruption).
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enterprises and project regulatory power through their commercial
activities. But other states may realize in SOEs either fundamental
development objectives or longer term projects of modernization
towards quite specific goals. The 2016 WG Report suggests the power
of that perspective in the construction of global standards.
The disjunction between legal duty of states and the societal
responsibilities of enterprises is centered on the substantial focus on
institutional formalism of the state duty that tends to ignore and
marginalize the object of the regulatory management goals that
appear to underlie the 2016 WG Report. Those goals touch on the
management of economic activity in whatever form it is undertaken.
And, indeed, the categorization that tends to find its greatest
contradiction in the conflation of public and private within the
operation of SOEs suggests the extent to which an insistence on
keeping to the antique niceties of law (for public bodies) and
governance (for non-state actors) makes little sense in a world in
which such actors tend increasingly to exhibit characteristics of
both. 235 The modern SOE is both state and enterprise
simultaneously. The legal rules based on their separation no longer
makes much sense.
C. The Possibility of Double Standards (Home State-Host State)
Detracts From Regulatory Coherence and Promotes Regulatory
Hierarchy
There is little mention of the ways in which the application of
both state duty and corporate responsibility might vary from the
home to host state, and from application to apex SOE and then
downstream to supply chain partners. The use of extraterritoriality
and a bilateral investment treaty-inspired internationalization of
local law applied more or less normally everywhere hardly suffices.
Indeed, recent G20 related approaches underline this difficulty. For
example, consider the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment
Policymaking (GPGIP), endorsed at the 2016 G20 Ministerial
Meeting under held under the Chinese presidency.236 James Zhang,
one of the conceptualizers and facilitators of the negotiation leading
to the GPGIP, explained the functional constraints of embedding
235. See Larry Cati Backer, Remarks, Transnational Legal Orders and Global
Regulatory Networks (May 15, 2017), http://www.theepe.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/05/RemarksFranquiSymposium5-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX4T-BAV9]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (discussing the fracturing of legal frameworks as gloval
systems of governance evolve).
236. See G20, ANNEX m: G20 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR GLOBAL INVESTMENT
POLICYMAKING 1-2 (2016), http/www.meti.go.jp/press/2016/07/20160711006/20160711006-
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCB8-X97A] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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corporate social responsibility (much less the human rights related
aspects of CSR) within principles based investment regimes.
The real-world situation is paradoxical in that, on the one hand,
there is a proliferation of CSR standards at the global, regional, and
national levels (including through thousands of industry and firm-
level standards and codes of conduct); on the other hand, the concept
of CSR is either weak or absent in most existing International
Investment Agreements (IIAs). 237
The current UNGP WG National Action Plan process23 8 only
highlights and deepens the contradictions-fostering a "not in my
backyard" attitude that permits developed states to impose stricter
standards to overseas conduct than to the conduct of their own apex
corporations within their home territories.23 9 Again, starting from the
basic premise that it is economic activity rather than discrete
institutions that are being regulated may help produce a better
conceptualization base for this issue.
D. Extraterritoriality Continues to Plague Regulatory Governance at
the Transnational Level
The continued obsession with extraterritoriality as a sort of
means of papering over governance failures down supply chains
ought to be reconsidered. 240 First, it exacerbates the unequal
237. JAMES ZHAN, G20 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR GLOBAL INVESTMENT
POLICYMAKING: A FACILITATOR'S PERSPECTIVE 6 (2016), http://el5initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Investment-Zhan-Final- 1.pdf. [https://perma.cc/7LCD-
4Z79] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
238. See U.N. WORKING GRP. ON BUS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON NAT'L
ACTION PLANS ON Bus. AND HUM. RTS. (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/BusinessUNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U2D-
ZK97] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
239. It is not unusual for National Action Plans to focus on the imposition of the
UNGP for outbound enterprise activity rather than for domestic activity of enterprises.
Few of them speak to the issue of SOEs, either domestic SOEs in their operations
abroad, or foreign SOEs operating within host states. An exception might be provided
by the National Action Plan of Columbia that speaks to the state as an economic actor.
But even here the emphasis is on the state as a governance organ of economic activity,
some of which might be directed toward or through the state itself ("El Estado es uno
de los actores econ6micos mAs relevantes para cualquier pais, desde su posici6n, debe
garantizar la protecci6n y el respeto de los derechos Humanos en el mundo
empresarial"). COLOMBIA AVANZA: DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EMPRESAS : PLAN DE ACCION
DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EMPRESAS (2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Business/ NationalPlans/PNAColombia_9dic.pdf [https://perma.cclTD7P-D65L]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017). See also Larry CatA Backer, On the U.S. National Action Plan
on Responsible Business Conduct, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Dec. 22, 2016),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/on-us-national-action-plan-on.html
[https://perma.cc/2KXF-RHGN] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (discussing the U.S. National
Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct).
240. See, e.g., MOSSAVAR-RAHMANI CTR. FOR BUS. & GOV'T., HARV. KENNEDY
SCH., EXPLORING EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SUMMARY
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relations among states. Extraterritoriality tends to be a useful
instrument for developed and powerful states. It tends to be of little
value to developing states. That is the hidden premise that underlies
much of the discussion about extraterritoriality-it is advanced
precisely because it advances the authority of certain "useful
players"-mostly Western states-to supplant the law of host states
with their own. The effect is to turn production chains into conduits
for the projection of national law.
Second, it tends to marginalize the voices of developing states,
where the bulk of human rights wrongs occur. And, indeed, its full
effects can be understood as a means of breaking up the domestic
legal orders of developing states along production chain lines.
Extraterritoriality colonizes developing states in which downstream
elements of production chains can be controlled by the home states of
apex multinationals.
Third, it serves as an impediment to development by
substituting foreign state power for the development of indigenous
capacity. Developing states that receive the law of developed states
through and to the extent of their connection to global production
chains lose their capacity to develop coherent national capacity for
macroeconomic planning and development.
Where the apex multinational is an SOE, the effect is even more
pronounced. In that case, the state undertakes a double projection of
power. First it projects power through law. Second it projects
governance through the operations of its enterprise. The business and
human rights project, then, can be understood as a project of
economic coherence through the flow of law and production from apex
SOEs downstream to receiving states. These are no doubt unpopular
arguments.24 1 Yet the dangers of extraterritoriality as a substitute or
NOTE OF EXPERT MEETING (2010), https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/
files/medialdocuments/ruggie-extraterritoriality- 14-sep-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cclG5M6-924Q] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (stating the issue was an
important element of the dialogue leading to the UNGP); see also Jennifer Zerk,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights Sphere from
Six Regulatory Areas (Harv. Corp. Soc. Resp. Initiative, Working Paper No. 59, 2010),
https://sites.hks.harvard.edulm-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper-59_zerk.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GDJ-9DDA] (archived Sept. 17, 2017) (exploring extraterritoriality
in the regulatory areas of anti-corruption, securities, antitrust, criminal law, civil cases
generally and the environment).
241. See Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When Human Rights
'Responsibilities' become 'Duties': The Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that Bind
Corporations, inHUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 271 (D. Bilchitz & S. Deva eds., 2013) (arguing "the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights grounded in the corporation's 'social
licence to operate' translates into its legal accountability for human rights violations");
Nadia Bernaz, Enhancing Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations: Is
Extraterritoriality the Magic Potion?, 117 J. Bus. ETHICS 493 (2013); Robert
McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility
for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70
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short term measure should not be underestimated.24 2 Perhaps SOEs,
like SWFs, might be seen as a vehicle for the internationalization of
legal norms; there is less danger of unfairness where state
enterprises seek only to embed international law in their operations.
Yet even in that respect, national interpretations of the extent and
character of international law may produce fracture rather than
coherence. As creatures of national law and policy, SOEs illuminate
the danger of using private forms to advance national ends abroad.
Yet there is little by way of policy or legal frameworks.2 43
E. There is a Contradiction between the Principle of Active
Shareholding and the Legal Protection of Corporate Autonomy and
Asset Partitioning
The focus on active shareholding and SOE autonomy creates
challenges to the integrity of global markets and its regulatory
governance. Ownership steering by the Finnish state apparatus
provides a window into the relationship between state and
enterprise.24 4 At its limit, a strong active shareholding by states-
operating by analogy to the controlling shareholder of a closely held
enterprise-can collapse the distinction between state and enterprise.
That implicates both sovereign immunity and the integrity of the
public-private distinction on which much law is still based. More
importantly, it suggests the collapse of the principle of corporate
autonomy at the heart of corporate law. Asset partitioning rules were
not designed to work in an SOE context in which the SOE is
considered a distinct and autonomous legal person for some purposes
and as an instrumentality of the state, like a ministry, for others.
Conventional legal approaches have not caught up with this more
fluid conception of corporate legal personality.
MOD. L. REV. 598 (2007); Michael Wabwile, Re-examining States' External Obligations
to Implement Economic and Social Rights of Children, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 407
(2009).
242. See, e.g., Anna Hankings-Evans, Power and Justice in International
Investment Law: China's Rise and Its Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations vis-a-
vis the African Host State Population, 4 THE CHINA MONITOR 6 (2016).
243. See Yuri Shima, The Policy Landscape for International Investment by
Government-controlled Investors, (OECD Working Papers On Int'l Inv. 2015/01, 2015),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2015-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J6A6-2BJM] (archived Sept. 17, 2017) (showing a trend toward treating certain SOEs
like commercial enterprises in investment treaties).
244. See Ownership Policy & Steering, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE OF FINLAND,
http://vnk.fi/en/ownership-policy-and-steering [https://perma.cc/6SD3-4MQD] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017) ("The state ownership policy and ownership steering in practice is
governed by legislation, the decisions of the Finnish Government and good corporate
governance. The Ownership Steering Department in the Prime Minister's Office is
responsible for the preparation and practical implementation of the State's ownership
policy and the control exercised in respect of the companies concerned.").
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F. Sovereign Immunity Serves as the Procrustean Bed245 on which
State-SOE Relations are Distorted, and with it the Global Economy
Related to the issue of asset partitioning and active ownership is
the more general issue of sovereign immunity. It seems odd that
sovereign immunity principles ought to drive the conceptualization of
the human rights in business conduct project of the UNGP. And the
result is policy distortion in the pursuit of coherence and legal
harmonization. And yet, that appears to be the way that the
narrative of SOE responsibility to respect and state duty to protect
human rights are themselves carefully structured around the legal
categories of current structures of sovereign immunity, a structure
created to serve the needs of an age before globalization. In this
respect, the European approach is instructive.246
Perhaps it is time to detach sovereign immunity from SOE
human rights duty/responsibility concepts. Better still, it is time to
abolish sovereign immunity in all respects from the exercise of the
state duty to protect human rights with respect to its ownership of
SOEs and to eliminate sovereign immunity entirely from SOE
activity. Yet this is an aspirational goal for which the time is not
close. The recent actions of the American Law Institute and its
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
touching on sovereign immunity suggests that adherence to ancient
principle remains quite strong even in the face of changing
underlying realities.247
245. As J. William Callison noted in the context of benefit corporations and the
shareholder welfare maximization principle:
In current parlance, a procrustean bed is an arbitrary standard to which exact
conformity is enforced; that which does not fit the standard is either ignored or
stretched and cut until compliant. A procrustean law is canonical, formal, rigid,
hard, and fast, from which there can be no deviation. Procrustean laws have
their place, and where uniformity is necessary or desired, Procrustes should
rear his head. However, procrustean laws have costs as well, since individual
circumstances, choice, and liberty are neglected at the expense of uniformity.
J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets On A Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, The Dangers Created, And Suggestions For
Change, 2 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 85, 86 (2012).
246. See European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, C.E.T.S. No.
074, 11 I.L.M. 470.
247. Jennifer Morinigo, U.S. Foreign Relations Law, Sovereign Immunity
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G. Encouraging Governance Gaps and Multiple Standards among
Classes of Public Economic Activity Produces Regulatory Incoherence
within States and Governance Gaps among them
The unnecessary constraint, grounded perhaps in an unfortunate
conflation of the differentiation among Second Pillar organizations
(as objects of state duty), and what should be a unitary approach to
state duty, may produce a missed opportunity and the possibility of
conceptual advances of state behaviors under the UNGP First Pillar.
Greater exploration of those issues is required as the conceptual basis
of the First Pillar is deepened. Much of this tension is grounded in old
habits, habits that might once have made sense but which no longer
square with the reality of the business of government. Sovereign
wealth funds and development banks now sometimes tend toward the
same objectives and sometimes engage in the same business.2 48 SOEs
may be the subsidiaries of SWFs.249 SOEs may engage in investment-
related activity. SOEs may serve as the internal financial market for
the global operations of an enterprise. Given the realities of economic
activities in this century, inertia, and the political difficulties of
conforming law to reality, serve as a drag on regulatory coherence
and thus on efficiency in the operation of the state and its
engagement in the economy.
This is particularly important in the context of the development
of the UNGP. Both the UNGP and the Working Group's efforts reflect
a strong willingness to compartmentalize investment versus direct
economic activity. The effect produces a division between the state's
oversight of SOEs and its investment related activity also embedded
in UNGP paragraph 4: export credit agencies, investment insurance
or guarantee agencies, and development-related agencies. 250
Conceptually, these distinctions are without difference with respect to
the duty of states.
H. Legalization through SOE Active Shareholding Damages the
UNGP Framework and Calls into Question the Value of Legalization
The suggestion that the UNGP Pillars are hierarchically
arranged, and that the State Duty Pillar invariably supersedes the
Corporate Responsibility Pillar when the two share governance
spaces, ought to be rejected. Where the scope of the state duty is
248. See Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 10.
249. See Turkey Transfers Stakes Worth Billions in Major Public Companies to




250. UNGP, supra note 6, ¶ 4.
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considerably narrower than the autonomous corporate responsibility
to respect, the result is a diminution of the scope of human rights
consideration rather than its augmentation. There might be little
comfort in the knowledge that what this narrowing "buys" is
"legalization" of the obligation-to the extent that the state itself
permits remedial mechanisms for its own failure of duty under the
First Pillar. This is a particularly troublesome consequence for SOEs.
Key developed states have developed a domestic legal order that may
not completely incorporate the entire corpus of law and governance
that are imposed on enterprises through the Second Pillar. At the
same time, states might well resist the embedding of international
law obligations they have rejected by requiring states to apply these
obligations within the operations of their SOEs. And lastly, in the
absence of a mechanism for uniform interpretation, even the uniform
provisions of the Second Pillar could receive substantially distinct
interpretations from state to state.25 1
I. The Perversities of Capacity Building in an Asymmetrical Global
Order
The issue of capacity building must be understood not merely as
a methodological issue but as an issue at the core of development.252
States that require substantial efforts at capacity building also may
require the funds necessary to effectively commit resources to the
development of capacity. But there is a more pernicious element to
capacity building obligations. In a global context in which only
developed states have the resources to fund capacity (or to buy it),
capacity-building obligations tend to have two consequences worth
considering. The first is that capacity building will tend to shift
toward developed states and toward international organizations-
international financial institutions in particular2 5 3-that have the
capacity to build capacity. The second is that developing states tend
to lose control over the shaping of the content of capacity. Capacity is
invariably understood in terms consonant with the interests of the
states against which capacity is judged. And it tends to affect the way
251. See Larry CatA Backer, From Guiding Principles to Interpretive
Organizations: Developing a Framework for Applying the UNGPs to Disputes that
Institutionalizes the Advocacy Role of Civil Society, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING 97-110 (C6sar Rodriguez Garavito ed.,
forthcoming 2017).
252. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKuYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD
ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004).
253. See, e.g., SAHR KPUNDEH & BRIAN LEVY, BUILDING STATE CAPACITY IN
AFRICA, (2004); Larry Cati Backer, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and
Sovereign Wealth Funds-SWFs as Instruments to Combat Corruption and Enhance
Fiscal Discipline in Developing States, INT'L REV. L. 5 (2015).
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in which elites respond both to indigenous desire and international
expectations. 254 Where the international expectations come from
SOEs, the problem is exacerbated-either the economics of the SOE
overtakes local politics or the politics of the SOE's owner trumps local
economics.
J. Data-Driven Regulatory Governance and Its Distorting Effects
The problem of the meaningfulness of data and data driven
disclosure and transparency systems remains unexplored. I have
suggested in previous articles that the narrative approach to
environmental, social, and human rights reporting is ineffective.255
This Article renews the call for the development of financial
statement-based reporting mechanisms for the value and cost of
environmental, social, and human rights compliance and failures to
comply. 256 Additionally, in the absence of a uniform standard, the
disclosure may be difficult to compare across industries and between
companies in the same sector. Perhaps some greater coordination on
disclosure methodologies would be useful for SOEs as well.
This is one theme that might merit substantially greater
exposition within the Second Pillar framework discussion, and one
especially well-suited to SOEs. Human rights due diligence
information might best be understood in the same way as financial
statement information. With respect to the latter, it has become a
matter of common knowledge that a single simple exposition is not
enough to provide an accurate picture. Instead at least three
"pictures" are needed. 257 Human rights due diligence ought to
produce an equivalent set of statements that, together, produce a
picture of corporate compliance with human rights obligations in a
manner that makes it possible to compare information between
reporting companies. That requires the production of a picture of
human rights compliance at the end of the company's fiscal or
reporting year (the balance sheet equivalent). It also requires an
assessment of the items that produced the change from one year to
the next (the income statement equivalent), provided in both
254. See generally Anna Persson & Martin Sj6stedt, The Political and Historical
Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior, in ELITES,
INSTITUTIONS AND THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT 69-92 (Carl Dahlstrom and Lena
Wingnerud eds., 2015).
255. See Larry CatA Backer, Moving Forward the U.N. Guiding Principles for
Business and Human Rights, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 457, 542 (2015).
256. See id. at 490.
257. The first is a picture of the condition of the enterprise at a moment in time
(e.g., the balance sheet). The second is a picture of the movement from one balance
sheet to another across time, focusing on the key elements of movements (e.g., the
income statement). The third separates technical from substantive changes in position
(e.g., the statement of cash flows).
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qualitative (identifying the particular rights affected and the source
of those rights) and quantitative (measuring the effect of the action)
terms. Lastly, human rights due diligence reports ought to provide an
analysis of the flow of human rights events across the business (the
statement of cash flows equivalent).
The financial statement equivalents approach produces reporting
coherence that is an essential part of a state's obligation to produce
policy coherence across its operations. Such policy and operational
coherence is less likely where appropriate monitoring of state activity
becomes difficult. One of the basic lessons of accounting in a global
context has been that information becomes less useful if it cannot be
readily read and understood from year to year and across
businesses. The great genius of generally accepted accounting
principleS258 was their utility as a means of developing a common
language for targeting information for harvesting, and for assessing
and digesting information. The focus of internationally accepted
accounting principles developed by an international body2 59 is to
make it possible for investors and others to produce a common
language for financial reporting information globally. Current
projects seeking to develop a common language are a useful first step,
but their failure to intimately connect to the financial reporting of
enterprises, especially SOEs, hampers that effectiveness as a
monitoring and accountability tool.260
V. CONCLUSION
The human rights responsibilities of corporations have become
better established; the human rights responsibilities of states,
however framed, are also well established. 261 But these
responsibilities and duties, though they intersect, do not speak to the
same actions or produce the same consequences. Where state duty
and corporate responsibility meet, the standards for holding both
state and enterprise to account becomes more complex.
258. These have been developed in the U.S. by the Financial Accounting
Standards Accounting Board. See Accounting Standards Updates - Effective Dates,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (Aug. 2017),
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/LandingPage&cid=1175805317350
[https://perma.cclGD3L-4ZM8] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
259. In this case the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). See
IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/ [https://perma.cc/57RD-GD8T] (Aug. 29, 2017).
260. See, e.g., UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK,
https://www.ungpreporting.org/ [https://perma.cc/GCE4-BANV] (archived Aug. 29,
2017).
261. Cf. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443, 491 (2001).
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This Article has taken a close look at the issue of the human
rights duties of states as owners of SOEs, and of the responsibilities
of SOEs for their own human rights related conduct. It offers a set of
ten challenges and recommendations for further development. These
recommendations and challenges suggest that issues of corporate
personality, of sovereign immunity, of asset partition, and of the
mania for compartmentalization that marks certain approaches to
global economic and financial regulation may well hobble the work of
embedding human rights within the operation of states as owners
and SOEs as public enterprises.
Both international human rights standards and SOEs have
evolved. The legal standards and premises within which these occur
have lagged considerably behind. SOEs are not merely enterprises
but also serve as key components of national macroeconomic
planning. SOEs are objects of development and state aid, but they
also serve as a conduit for both.26 2 The state sits at all ends of the
operation of SOEs-owner, regulator, financer, and coordinator with
other public and private productive sectors. The resulting
relationships produce effects far beyond that which the regulatory
framework can digest, much less positively manage. The failure is
most apparent in the context of the human rights obligations of states
and SOEs, where the social responsibilities of SOEs to the state and
state objectives may be in conflict with the normative obligations of
enterprises (as well as their state owners and state-owned financers)
to protect or respect human rights in accordance with international
norms. Focusing on the effects of economic activity rather than on the
legal character of the economic actor might serve as a first step
toward better integration of international human rights standards
into the operations of states and their economic and financial
instrumentalities.
262. See Hu Yongqi, State Council Designates 92 Bases for Entrepreneurship
and Business Startups, CHINA DAILY (June 22, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2017-06/22/content_29849346.htm [https://perma.cc/QP2N-EBQN] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017).
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